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INTRODUCTION
n examination of history reveals that the world’s geopolit-
ical map is in a constant state of flux. Since ancient
times, empires have come and gone and new political units
have emerged, only in turn to be superseded by others. This
evolutionary process is an ongoing one. Indicative of this is that
in the post-World War II era many states have been created
directly and indirectly by unilateral non-colonial (“UNC”) se-
cession,1 including Bangladesh (Pakistan), Eritrea (Ethiopia),2
1. The definition of “secession” is discussed in Part I of the present arti-
cle. For immediate purposes, however, it is apposite to note that secession
can be classified according to whether it is consensual, unilateral, colonial, or
non-colonial. Unilateral non-colonial (“UNC”) secession refers to the unilat-
eral withdrawal of non-colonial territory from part of an existing state to cre-
ate a new state. On the definition of secession, see generally Glen Anderson,
Secession in International Law and Relations: What Are We Talking About?,
35 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 343–88 (2013).
2. Although Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia was the result of a ref-
erendum in April 1993, this was preceded by a prolonged period of armed
resistance by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (“EPLF”) and can there-
fore be substantively classified as unilateral in nature. See generally Minasse
A
4 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,3 Slovenia,4 Montene-
gro, Serbia, Kosovo (Yugoslavia), and South Sudan (Sudan).5
Unsuccessful UNC secessions, such as the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (Republic of Cyprus), Chechnya (Russia), Ab-
khazia (Georgia),6 South Ossetia (Georgia),7 and Transnistria
Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 479
(1994); JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
402–03 (2d ed. 2006); Seifudein A. Hussein, The Conflict in Eritrea Reconsid-
ered, 18 J. MUSLIMMINORITYAFF. 159 (1998).
3. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia are generally considered
to have emerged to independence after the Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia (“SFRY”) had become extinct (post-1992). Nonetheless, the
SFRY’s extinction was facilitated by previous UNC secessions. See STEVE
TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER COMMISSION: A
CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACEMAKING IN THE POST COLD-WAR WORLD 32
(2000); Mark Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of The
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT’L. L. 569 (1992).
4. Macedonia is also generally considered to have emerged to independ-
ence after the SFRY was extinct (post-1992) thereby ensuring that no exist-
ing parent state remained to challenge Macedonian independence. Nonethe-
less, the SFRY’s extinction was facilitated by previous UNC secessions. See
PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 194–95
(2002).
5. Although South Sudan achieved independence as the result of a refer-
endum, this was preceded by “the longest civil conflict on the continent [of
Africa].” Khalid Medani, Strife and Secession in Sudan, 22 J. DEMOCRACY
135, 135 (2011). As observed by Silva, “[t]he former unitary state of Sudan
had been plagued by bitter internecine conflict for more than half a century,
and as a result, an estimated 2.5 million people lost their lives and over five
million were internally displaced.” Mario Silva, After Partition: The Perils of
South Sudan, 3 U. BALT. J. INT’L L. 63, 65 (2015). This means that substan-
tively, South Sudan’s secession could be regarded as unilateral in nature.
6. Abkhazia may eventually become a successful UNC secession, given
that at the time of writing, Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru, have
extended recognition on August 26, 2008, September 5, 2008, September 10,
2009, December 15, 2009, and December 15, 2009 respectively. But see Jelena
Radoman, Future Kosovo Status – Precedent or Universal Solution, 3 W.
BALKANS SECURITY OBSERVER 14, 14 (2006). For discussion of the Abkhazia
conflict, see generally CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GEORGIA: A SYNTHESIS
ANALYSIS WITH A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 1–58 (Antje Herrberg ed., 2006) [herein-
after CONFLICT RESOLUTION INGEORGIA].
7. South Ossetia may eventually become a successful UNC secession,
given that Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru have extended recogni-
tion on August 26, 2008, September 5, 2008, September 10, 2009, and De-
cember 15, 2009, respectively. For discussion of the South Ossetia Conflict,
see generally CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GEORGIA, supra note 6, at 1–58; Ange-
lika Nußberger, The War Between Russia and Georgia – Consequences and
2015] Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession 5
(Moldova), to name but a few, also highlight the importance of
this method of state creation.
While existing legal scholarship tends to focus on whether
particular UNC secessions are legal or illegal in international
law,8 the present article adopts a course of inquiry less famil-
iar. It instead analyzes the interactions between UNC seces-
sion and the criteria for statehood in international law. In this
respect a three point thesis is developed. First, it is argued that
the law of self-determination has resulted in a less strict appli-
cation of the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness, par-
ticularly the effective government criterion. This means that a
state created by UNC secession pursuant to the law of self-
determination will not have its statehood called into question if
it lacks an effective government. Second, it is argued that the
declaratory approach to recognition is more reflective of inter-
national practice than the constitutive, meaning that a state
created by UNC secession can exist in international law with-
out the recognition of other states provided that the criteria for
statehood are satisfied. Third, in light of the preceding two
points, it is argued that there are many examples of UNC se-
cessionist “entities” that have been denied statehood by the in-
ternational community. This is explicable by the fact that com-
pliance with peremptory norms is now an integral aspect of
state creation. This means that a state created by UNC seces-
sion must not violate, inter alia, the peremptory norms of the
right of peoples to self-determination and the prohibition on
the illegal use of force, or else it will languish as a stateless en-
tity, subject to a legal obligation of nonrecognition.
Unresolved Questions, 1 GÖTTINGEN J. INT’L. L. 341, 341 (2009); Gerard Toal,
Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War Over South
Ossetia, 49 EURASIANGEOGRAPHY&ECON. 670, 670 (2009).
8. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL (1995); THOMAS MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL
MINORITIES (1997); M. Rafiqul Islam, Secession Crisis in Papua New Guinea:
The Proclaimed Republic of Bougainville in International Law, 13 U. HAW. L.
REV. 458 (1991); Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8
EMORY INT’L L.J. 479 (1994); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under Inter-
national Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 257
(1981); M. G. Kaladharan Nayer, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial
Context: Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEX. INT’L L.J. 337 (1975); Elysa L. Teric,
Comment, The Legality of Croatia’s Right to Self-Determination, 6 TEMP. INT’L
&COMP. L.J. 403 (1992).
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The article is divided into six principal Parts. Part I provides
a brief introduction to the concept of secession. It demonstrates
that “secession” is an encompassing method of state creation,
which can be clarified according to whether it is consensual,
unilateral, colonial, or non-colonial. Part II outlines the param-
eters of the right to UNC secession in international law. This
Part demonstrates that the right is qualified (meaning it is not
open ended) and is grounded in international customary law.
More particularly, this Part shows that a right to UNC seces-
sion stems from a combination of declaratory General Assem-
bly resolutions and state physical acts and omissions, especial-
ly acts of recognition in response to UNC secessionist disputes.
Part III analyzes the criteria for statehood based on effective-
ness, with particular attention as to how the law of self-
determination has modified the effective government criterion.
Broadly, this Part argues that a state created by UNC seces-
sion in conformity with the customary law of self-determination
will no longer have to strictly satisfy to the effective govern-
ment criterion. Part IV examines whether recognition is an ad-
ditional criterion for statehood, finding in the negative. Princi-
pally, this flows from the fact that the declaratory recognition
theory—despite its imperfections and imprecisions—is more
reflective of state practice than the constitutive theory. Part V
analyzes the criteria for statehood based on compliance with
peremptory norms (jus cogens) and how these might interact
with UNC secession. Generally, this Part propounds that self-
determination is a peremptory norm, and that a UNC seces-
sionist entity which is created contrary to this norm will be de-
void of statehood. The conclusion synthesizes all aspects of the
preceding discussion and establishes that a state created by
UNC secession pursuant to the law of self-determination will
not have to strictly satisfy the criteria for statehood based on
effectiveness, particularly the effective government criterion,
but will be required to comply with peremptory norms.
I. SECESSION
Secession can be defined as “the withdrawal of territory (co-
lonial or non-colonial) from part of an existing state to create a
new state.”9 This definition includes consensual,10 unilateral,11
9. Anderson, supra note 1, at 344, 386–88.
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colonial,12 and non-colonial13 secession.14 Secession is thus a
broad method of state creation; it is not confined to unilateral-
ism15 or situations where the secessionist group uses or threat-
ens to use force.16 The unifying element which ties all varieties
of secession together is an endogenously motivated withdraw-
al.17 This then begs the important question: what is it that is
being withdrawn? The definition above supplies the answer:
territory. However, the withdrawal of territory is not just a
physical process; it is also a legal one. The concomitant of phys-
10. Consensual secession occurs with the existing state’s consent. It can be
conceptually subdivided into constitutional and politically negotiated seces-
sion.
11. Unilateral secession occurs without the existing state’s consent. It may
or may not involve the use or threat of force.
12. Secession can be validly said to occur in a colonial context, as any new
assertion of sovereignty over a colonial territory involves a modification to the
sovereignty of the metropolitan power. For examples of scholarship suggest-
ing that secession can occur in the colonial (and non-colonial) context, see
HANNA BOKOR-SZEGÖ, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 53 (1978); CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 330, 375; INGRID DETTER
DE LUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 15 n.4 (2d ed.
1987); MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at 181; Christine Haverland, Secession, in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 354–55 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed.,
2000); FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 235 (2003); Frank Przetacznik, The Basic Collective
Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations as a Prerequisite
for Peace, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 49, 103–04 (1990); Peter Radan, Seces-
sion: A Word in Search of a Meaning, in ON THE WAY TO STATEHOOD:
SECESSION AND GLOBALISATION 18 (Aleksandar Pavkovič & Peter Radan eds.,
2008); Malcolm N. Shaw, The Role of Recognition and Non-Recognition with
Respect to Secession: Notes on Some Relevant Issues, in SECESSION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFLICT AVOIDANCE – REGIONAL APPRAISALS 245 (Julie
Dahlitz ed., 2003); Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination and Indigenous
Peoples: Objection and Responses, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 52, 54 (Pekka Aiko & Martin
Scheinin eds., 2000).
13. As used in this article, non-colonial shall mean a territory that is part
of an existing state and outside of the colonial context.
14. For a more comprehensive exploration of the definition of secession in
international law and relations, see Anderson, supra note 1, at 343–88.
15. Unilateralism is mandated by Heraclides for example. See ALEXIS
HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 1 (1991).
16. The use or threat of force (along with a lack of consent from the exist-
ing state) is mandated by Crawford. See CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 375.
17. Anderson, supra note 1, at 345–49.
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ical, territorial withdrawal is the legal withdrawal of sover-
eignty. Secession is thus not simply concerned with the with-
drawal of territory from an existing state to create a new state,
but also the legal withdrawal of sovereignty asserted over this
territory.18
II. THE RIGHT TOUNC SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The legal basis of the right to UNC secession in international
law has several significant characteristics. First, this right is
grounded in the law of self-determination. Unlike many other
human rights, self-determination is applicable to groups, or
“peoples” (defined as a nationally-based substate group) that
are empowered to “freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment.”19 This means that should a people within an existing
state be systematically and egregiously denied this right, then
the prospect of UNC secession will become available.20 Thus,
should a people within an existing state be denied their right to
internal self-determination, then a right to external self-
determination, or UNC secession, will arise.
Second, the legal basis for a remedial right to UNC secession
in international law is to be found within customary interna-
tional law. No basis for UNC secession can be found within in-
ternational treaty instruments, such as the United Nations
Charter, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
18. Id. at 346–49.
19. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art.
1(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1(1),
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1(1) (Dec. 16, 1966);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
art. 1(1) (Dec. 16, 1966); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), art. 2 (Dec. 14, 1960); Dec-
laration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Principle 5, ¶ 1 (Oct. 24, 1970); United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art.
3 (Sept. 13, 2007).
20. See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, paras.
126, 134–38; Loizidou v Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2241 (Wilhaber,
J., concurring).
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tural Rights (ICESCR) or International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). The right to UNC secession in cus-
tomary international law finds its genesis in Principle 5 para-
graph 7 of the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations21
(“Friendly Relations Declaration”), which provides:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as au-
thorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or politi-
cal unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people be-
longing to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
color.22
This text is repeated, mutatis mutandis, by Article 1 of the Dec-
laration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
United Nations23 which provides that the U.N. will, inter alia:
[c]ontinue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all
peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peo-
ples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or for-
eign occupation, and recognize the right of peoples to take le-
gitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to realize their inalienable right to self-
determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, to-
tally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory with-
out distinction of any kind.24
21. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
22. Id., principle 5, ¶ 7 (emphasis added).
23. G.A. Res. 50/6, art. 1 (Oct. 24, 1995). For an extended analysis of this
Declaration and its legal effects, see Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial
Secession in International Law and Declaratory General Assembly Resolu-
tions: Textual Content and Legal Effects, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 345
(2013).
24. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 23, art. 1 (emphasis added).
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When subjected to an a contrario reading, the foregoing indi-
cates that only those states which represent their population
“without distinction of any kind” are entitled to guarantees
with respect to their “territorial integrity or political unity” and
that accordingly, UNC secession will be permissible under cer-
tain strictly circumscribed circumstances.25 Therefore any right
to UNC secession must be qualified in nature.26
Third, the mere textual articulation of a qualified right to
UNC secession in declaratory General Assembly resolutions,
without other concomitant state practice, such as grants of
recognition in response to UNC secessionist disputes, will not
constitute a binding rule of customary international law. This
is because the requisite element of opinio juris will not have
been satisfied. In Nicaragua v the United States of America,27
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), with reference to the
principle of nonintervention, enumerated a two stage test for
determining whether the requirement of opinio juris had been
satisfied. According to stage one:
[O]pinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced
from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of
States towards certain General Assembly resolutions, and
particularly resolution 2625(XXV) entitled “Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Char-
ter of the United Nations.” The effect of consent to the text of
such resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a “re-
iteration or elucidation” of the treaty commitment undertaken
in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared
by the resolution by themselves.28
The court later continued: “[a]s already observed, the adoption
by States of this text [the Friendly Relations Declaration] af-
fords an indication of their opinio juris as to customary inter-
national law on the question.”29 According to stage two:
25. Id.
26. Anderson, supra note 23, at 355–60, 371.
27. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 170 (June 27).
28. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 188.
29. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 191. Franck has opined that “[t]he effect of
this enlarged concept of the lawmaking force of General Assembly resolu-
tions” is that it “may well . . . caution states to vote against ‘aspirational’ in-
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“[n]otwithstanding the multiplicity of declarations by States
accepting the principle of non-intervention, there remain two
questions: first, what is the exact content of the principle so
accepted, and secondly, is the practice sufficiently in conformity
with it for this to be a rule of customary international law?”30
This new species of opinio juris—tailored to the context of de-
claratory General Assembly Resolutions—would seem to con-
tradict the more traditional formulation, as expressed in the
Lotus Case31 and North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,32 which
provided that opinio juris could only be established after a
train of consistent state acts or omissions attended by the req-
uisite psychological belief that such acts or omissions were
rendered legally obligatory. As Schachter has noted, this new
species of opinio juris:
[W]as seen by some critics as standing custom[ary law] on its
head. In place of a practice that began with the gradual accre-
tion of acts and subsequently received the imprimatur of opin-
io juris, the Court reversed the process: an opinio juris ex-
pressed first as a declaration would become law if confirmed
by general practice.33
struments if they do not intend to embrace them totally and at once, regard-
less of circumstance.” Thomas M. Franck, Some Observations on the ICJ’s
Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 116, 119 (1987).
Whilst Franck’s observation is valid, as Judge Schwebel pointed out in a 1972
Hague lecture, the Friendly Relations Declaration was “adopted by acclama-
tion and accepted by the General Assembly as declaratory of international
law.” Stephen M. Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence, 136
RECUEIL DES COURS 446, 452 n.11 (1972). Schwebel holds the same opinion
regarding the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
Id. Supporting this view, Schachter remarks that “[m]ost states, including
the United States, refer frequently to this resolution [the Friendly Relations
Declaration] as an authoritative expression of the law of the Charter and
related customary law.” Oscar Schachter, Just War and Human Rights, 1
PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1989).
30. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 205. The court also noted that “[t]he exist-
ence in the opinio juris of States of the principle of non-intervention is backed
by established and substantial practice.” Id. ¶ 202.
31. S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7).
32. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den./Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J 3,
44 (Feb. 20).
33. Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary
Practice, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 531, 531–32 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996); Rijpkema has similarly
noted in the context of Nicaragua that
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Accordingly, without congruity between declaratory General
Assembly resolutions and state practice in terms of physical
acts and omissions, a binding rule of customary international
law cannot be formed.34
Fourth, state practice indicates that the right to UNC seces-
sion is only available in response to human rights abuses in
extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and genocide) as op-
posed to in moderato (political, cultural, and racial discrimina-
tion). UNC secession case studies, such as Bangladesh, Croatia,
Kosovo, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (“TRNC”),
Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria collec-
tively bear this out.35
Fifth, there is a disparity between the textual content of de-
claratory General Assembly resolutions, such as Principle 5
paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration and Article 1
of the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration, both of which appear
to articulate a qualified right to UNC secession in response to
human rights abuses in moderato and in extremis, and state
practice more generally. The latter, it would seem, only sup-
ports a right to UNC secession in response to human rights
abuses in extremis.36 From this it follows that the textual artic-
ulation of a qualified right to UNC secession in declaratory
General Assembly resolutions must not be the litmus test for a
customary international law right to UNC secession. Rather, a
more nuanced approach is necessary which examines state
[t]his term [opinio juris] which refers to the legal convention of
States, is apparently given a broader meaning than usual in the
Nicaragua case. It transpires that manifestations of States’ legal
conventions do not necessarily need to relate to acts of States which
constitute a settled practice in order to be identified as statement of
opinio juris.
Peter P. Rijpkema, Customary Law in the Nicaragua Case, 20 NETH. Y.B.
INT’L L. 92, 92–93 (1989).
34. Anderson, supra note 23, at 394.
35. See discussion of case studies infra, Part III.C.2. and Part IV.B.2.
36. Although a broader right to UNC secessionist self-determination, justi-
fied on the grounds of human rights abuses in moderato and in extremis ar-
guably forms lex ferenda, it would not currently appear to be reflected in
state practice. This is regrettable, as UNC secessionist self-determination
should not be confined only to human rigths abuses in extremis. See Ander-
son, supra note 23, at 394–95.
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practice in toto, particularly grants of recognition in response
to UNC secessionist disputes.37
The culmination of the foregoing characteristics is that any
state created by UNC secession pursuant to the customary in-
ternational law of self-determination must be in response to
human rights abuses in extremis. This means that the right to
UNC secession in international law is an ultimum remedium.38
III. UNC SECESSION AND THE CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD BASED
ON EFFECTIVENESS
Effectiveness is a principle applicable to many aspects of in-
ternational law. Milano, for example, has suggested that the
principle of effectiveness relates to state recognition, responsi-
bility of substate actors, sovereignty, citizenship, and ethnici-
ty.39 Effectiveness thus alludes to the links between facts and
law, ensuring that there is a tangible connection between the
two.40 This link is necessary if international law is to promote
stability and security in international relations.41
37. Anderson, supra note 23, at 394; see also discussion of case studies
infra Part III.C.2. and Part IV.B.2.
38. Anderson, supra note 23, at 394–95.
39. According to Milano,
A state is recognized as such in international law because it is con-
stituted by a stable and effective institutional machinery, an insur-
rectional movement is responsible under international law because it
has effective control over a population and territory, sovereignty over
a territory is often conditional on an effective display of jurisdiction,
the citizenship of an individual may be recognized in international
law insofar as it entails an underlying effective relationship (‘genu-
ine link’) between the state and the individual, the membership to a
minority or ethnic group may be determined under objective criteria
of effective attachment.
ENRICO MILANO, UNLAWFUL TERRITORIAL SITUATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
RECONCILINGEFFECTIVENESS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 22, 22–23 (2006).
40. This has led Wildeman to claim that effectiveness refers to the “special
influence of facts on law.” J. Wildeman, The Philosophical Background of
Effectiveness, 24 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 337 (1977). Milano has similarly noted
that “[e]ffectiveness is deployed here as a measure of the relationship and
congruence between a rule or a legal situation and social reality. It mainly
refers to the role of factual situations in respect to the application and crea-
tion of international law.” MILANO, supra note 39, at 22.
41. GERARD KREIJEN, STATE FAILURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFECTIVENESS:
LEGAL LESSONS FROM THE DECOLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 180
(2004); H. Krüger, Das Prinzip de Effektivität, oder: über die besondere Wirk-
14 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
The criteria for statehood based on effectiveness have been
enumerated in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States, which has been traditionally
accepted as reflective of customary law: “[t]he state as a person
of international law should possess the following qualifications:
(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) govern-
ment; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other
states.”42 An additional criterion—independence—has also
been widely held as essential for effectiveness and statehood.43
These criteria, and their contemporary application (or modifi-
cation) in the context of UNC secession, are discussed below.
A. Permanent Population
A state created by UNC secession must possess a permanent
population.44 As indicated by the Western Sahara Case,45 a
permanent population does not need to be a constant one.46 On
the other hand, populations which only move into a territory
for the purpose of gaining economic benefits, or to conduct sci-
entific research, will not qualify.47
lichkeitsnähe des Völkerrechts, in GRUNDPROBLEME DES VÖLKERRECHTS
[FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] 265 (D. S. Constantopolous
et al. eds., 1957).
42. These criteria antedated the adoption of the Montevideo Convention.
Some scholars, however, have since examined the Montevideo Convention
and proposed different criteria. Galloway has mooted de facto control of terri-
tory and government, public acquiescence in the authority of the government,
and a willingness to comply with international obligations. See THOMAS L.
GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: THE PRACTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES 5–7 (1978). For a historical and critical analysis of the Monte-
video criteria, see Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo
Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403 (1999).
43. This criterion may arguably be subsumable within Article 1(d) of the
Montevideo Convention. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 52; DAVID
RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 74 (2002).
44. Id. at 58; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 52.
45. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 61 (Oct. 16).
46. Gino J. Naldi, The Statehood of the Saharan Arab Democratic Repub-
lic, 25 INDIAN J. INT’L L., 448, 452–53 (1985); MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (7th ed. 2013).
47. Antarctica, for example, which is populated by scientific personnel, is
not a state. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (7th ed. 1997); Bengt Broms, States, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 41, 44 (Mohammed Be-
djaoui ed., 1991). Underwater claims will not qualify either. The Republic of
Minerva, for example, was purportedly established throughout unclaimed
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B. Defined Territory
A state created by UNC secession must possess a defined ter-
ritory.48 This does not mean, however, that there must be an
absence of disputed frontiers.49 A 1929 German-Polish Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal emphasized this point:
Whatever may be the importance of the delimitation of
boundaries, one cannot go so far as to maintain that as long
as this delimitation has not been legally effected the State in
question cannot be considered as having any territory what-
ever . . . . In order to say that a State exists . . . it is enough
that this territory has a sufficient consistency, even though
its boundaries have not yet been accurately delimited, and
that the State actually exercises independent public authority
over that territory.50
underwater reefs. The Republic was not at any time a state, however, be-
cause a permanent population could not dwell within the claimed territory.
See Bengt Broms, Subjects: Entitlement in the International Legal System, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY 383–86 (R. St. J. Macdonald & D. M.
Johnston eds., 1983); RAIČ, supra note 43, at 58–59.
48. There is no minimum territorial area necessary. Nor is territorial con-
tiguity necessary. See CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 47.
49. As Crawford has observed, “It is clear that the existence of fully de-
fined frontiers is not required . . . .” JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (8th ed. 2012). Shaw has noted that “there
is no necessity in international law for defined and settled boundaries.”
MALCOMN. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (7th ed. 2014). In another context,
Shaw notes “statehood is inconceivable in the absence of a reasonably defined
geographical base. The frontiers of such an entity need not be established
beyond dispute . . . .” Malcom N. Shaw, Territory in International Law, 13
NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 61, 61 (1982). Abi-Saab alludes to the 1924 Advisory
Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the case of
Monastery of Saint-Naoum (Albanian Frontier) to support the notion that a
state’s territory does not need to be exactly and completely delimited. See
Georges Abi-Saab, Conclusion, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW
PERSPECTIVES 471, 475 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2012), citing Question of the
Monastery of Saint-Naoum (Albanian Frontier), Advisory Opinion, 1924
P.C.I.J (ser. F) No. 9, at 5 (Sept. 4).
50. Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State, 5 I.L.R. 11
(Ger.-Pol. Mixed Arb. Trib. 1929). See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at
49–50; RAIČ, supra note 43, at 61.
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This general rule was later affirmed in the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf Cases51 and Case Concerning the Territorial Dis-
pute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad).52
On the other hand, a state created by UNC secession cannot
claim territory in an ad hoc fashion. As Raič has observed, Ser-
bian Krajina’s attempted UNC secession from Croatia failed to
satisfy the defined territory criterion, due to the constantly
shifting nature of its external borders. It was unclear, for in-
stance, which municipalities were included within Serbian
Krajina and which were excluded.53 A state created by UNC
secession must therefore make clear to the international com-
munity which territory it has claimed and maintain fidelity to
the claim’s specific nature.
1. Application of the Uti Possidetis Principle in the Context of
UNC Secession
A question that has emerged in recent decades is whether a
state created by UNC secession must adhere to the former in-
ternal administrative boundaries of the existing state, especial-
ly where these boundaries possess a federal character. Of direct
significance to this question is the uti possidetis principle,
which enshrines respect for boundaries of an administrative
nature in the context of colonial secession.54 Shaw, for example,
has observed that:
51. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 20). See
generally CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 50.
52. Territorial Dispute (Libyun Aruh Jamuhiriyu/Chad), Judgment, 1994
I.C.J. 6, ¶¶ 44, 52.
53. According to one spokesman of Serbs within Croatia, the municipality
of Petrinja, which had an ethnic composition of approximately 50 percent
Croat and 50 percent Serbs, was included within Serbian Krajina. According
to another spokesperson of Serbs within Croatia though, Petrinja was not
included within Croatia. This imprecision naturally militated against the
attainment of statehood for Serbian Krajina. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 62 n.49.
54. Raič, for example, has noted that
[t]he principle of uti possidetis only operates in those situations
where the parties agree on its applicability or, in the absence of such
an agreement [such as unilateral secession which by its very nature
is non-consensual], if no agreement with regard to a different meth-
od or principle has been reached.
RAIČ, supra note 43, at 305.
2015] Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession 17
In essence, the doctrine [uti possidetis] provides that new
States will come to independence with the same borders that
they had when they were administrative units within the ter-
ritory or territories of one colonial power . . . . The principle . .
. functions in the context of the transmission of sovereignty
and the creation of a new independent State and conditions
that process.55
The uti possidetis principle thus functions to ensure that where
there is a withdrawal of sovereignty over an administrative
territory, the territorial boundaries attached thereto are pro-
tected, final, and permanent. This is not to say that these
boundaries cannot be subsequently modified; they of course can
be, but this may only occur by peaceful means and by agree-
ment between the relevant states parties.
The uti possidetis principle is descended from Roman law,
which imposed a Praetor’s interdict that forbade the disturb-
ance of the existing state of possession over immovable proper-
ty.56 In effect, this meant that the possessor of land, in the ab-
sence of any established title thereto, had the right to be free
from any disturbance by the adversary. The Praetor held that,
“[u]ti nunc aes aedas, quibus, de agitur, nec vi nec clam nec pre-
cario alter ab altero possidetis, quo minus ita possidetis, vim
fieri veto.”57 This extended Latin maxim was succinctly ex-
pressed as “uti possidetis, ita possidetis,” or “as you possess, so
you may possess.”58 Importantly, although the Praetor’s inter-
dict confirmed the right of the current possessor of immovable
property, it would always give way to the rights of any person
who could establish that they possessed legal title to the prop-
55. Malcolm N. Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Posside-
tis Juris Today, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.75, 97–98 (1996).
56. In ancient Rome, a Praetor was an elected magistrate, whose duties
varied according to the historical period.
57. For an English translation, see John Basset More, Memorandum on
Uti Possidetis: Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration 1911, in 3 THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT MORE 329 (Edwin Borchard et. al. eds., 1944) (“As
you possess the house in question, the one not having obtained it by force,
clandestinely, or by permission from the other, I forbid force to be used to the
end that you may not continue so to possess it.”); see also RADAN, supra note
4, at 69 n.2.
58. Id. at 69; RAIČ, supra note 43, at 297.
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erty. In a strict sense, therefore, the uti possidetis interdict was
only of a provisional nature.59
In the early nineteenth century, the uti possidetis principle
was applied in the context of decolonization throughout Central
and South America when Spanish and Portuguese colonies
achieved their independence.60 The principle was employed to
achieve two outcomes: first, and most importantly, to prevent a
resurgence of European colonization based on the argument
that some areas of the former Spanish and Portuguese colonies
were terra nullius and thus open to occupation; and second, to
ensure that boundary disputes did not erupt between the newly
created states.61 As Raič has noted, “[t]he preservation of the
colonial administrative demarcations after the change of sover-
eignty implied the transformation of these boundaries into in-
ternational boundaries. A corollary of the latter aspect was
that uti possidetis constituted a method of demarcation of in-
ternational boundaries.”62
The uti possidetis principle was subsequently applied in the
decolonization of Africa. Unlike Latin America, however, where
the principle operated to exclude the application of terra nul-
lius after European decolonization, in Africa, the principle’s
primary purpose was to ensure the continuity of colonial
boundaries. In the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute
(Burkina Faso and Mali),63 the ICJ’s Chamber explained the
rationale informing the adoption of the principle as follows:
[T]he principle is not a special rule which pertains only to one
specific system of international law. It is a general principle,
which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the ob-
taining of independence wherever it occurs. Its obvious pur-
pose is to prevent the independence and stability of new
States being endangered by fratricidal struggles following the
withdrawal of the administering power.64
59. RADAN, supra note 4, at 69–70; Frank Wooldridge, Uti Possidetis Doc-
trine, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1259, 1259 (Rudolf
Bernhardt ed., 2000).
60. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 298; RADAN, supra note 4, at 245–46.
61. IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC
ENCYCLOPAEDIA 9–12 (1979); RAIČ, supra note 43, at 298.
62. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 298.
63. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554
(Dec. 22).
64. Id. at 565.
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The Chamber explained further:
[T]he maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is of-
ten seen as the wisest course, to preserve what has been
achieved by peoples who have struggled for their independ-
ence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive the con-
tinent of the gains achieved by much sacrifice. The essential
requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and
gradually to consolidate their independence in all fields, has
induced African States judiciously to consent to the respecting
of colonial frontiers.65
Respect for former colonial borders was especially important in
Africa, as metropolitan powers66 had divided the continent with
little regard for the ethnic and tribal groups which dwelt there-
in, arbitrarily separating such groups, often between two or
three territories. If borders were to be open to challenge, Afri-
can independence could have become susceptible to interethnic
conflict—secessionist or irredentist67—which metropolitan
powers would have likely seized upon as justification for con-
tinued occupation.
The need for the continuity of borders was emphasized at the
Organization of African Unity’s (“OAU”) inaugural summit con-
ference, when the Prime Minister of Ethiopia declared, “it is in
the interest of all Africans now to respect the frontiers drawn
on the maps, whether they are good or bad, by the former colo-
nizers.”68 This sentiment was repeated in the Cairo Declaration
adopted in 1964 by the Heads of States of OAU governments.
The Declaration provided that “all Member States (vis-à-vis
each other) pledge themselves to respect the borders existing
65. Id. at 567.
66. A “metropolitan power” is defined within Resolution 1541, Principles
Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation
Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under Article 73e of the Char-
ter, G.A. Res 1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960), so as to connote an administering
power, which is “geographically separate” and “distinct ethnically and/or cul-
turally” from the administered territory. In other words, a metropolitan pow-
er is a colonial administering power. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 374–75.
67. As to the meaning of “irrendentism,” and its contrast with “secession,”
see Anderson, supra note 1, at 371–73.
68. Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States,
May 1963, OAU Doc. CIAS/GEN/INF/43; see also A. C. McEwen,
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF EAST AFRICA 24 (1971); RAIČ, supra note 43, at
299.
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on their achievement of the national independence.”69 This has
been interpreted by the ICJ as directly referring to the uti pos-
sidetis principle.70
The uti possidetis principle has therefore been applied in the
context of decolonization in Latin America and Africa. As Ra-
dan has noted, the principle was also applied in the context of
Asia, although it was less prevalent.71 It could therefore be
strongly argued, with recourse to customary international law,
that states born of unilateral colonial (“UC”) secession must
adopt borders that coincide with former colonial borders.
Considerable doubt however, has been expressed regarding
the principle’s application to states created by UNC secession.72
As Radan has observed:
To insist that, in cases of secession from a federal state, in-
ternal administrative borders should automatically become
international borders is to create a new rule of international
law. To justify the application of this rule as an application of
the principle of uti possidetis juris amounts to an unprinci-
pled extension of the principle that applies in cases of ascer-
taining international borders following decolonisation. Such a
new rule has no connection with its alleged progenitor.73
Or as Lalonde has noted:
[T]here appears to be no legal basis for the Arbitration Com-
mission’s characterization of uti possidetis as a general prin-
69. The text of the Declaration is reproduced in BROWNLIE, supra note 61,
at 11. See also RAIČ, supra note 43, at 300.
70. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554,
556 (Dec. 22); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment,
1999 I.C.J. 1043, 1059–60 (Dec. 13).
71. Radan relies on the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch)
between India and Pakistan (India v. Pakistan) (Feb. 19, 1968), 50 ILR 1, 2
(1968). The same scholar further notes that the other commonly cited case in
the Asian context allegedly touching upon the principle of uti possidetis is the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6,
49–53 (June 15). Radan rejects the relevance of this case, however, instead
asserting that it was “based on the interpretation of a treaty and had nothing
to do with uti possidetis.” RADAN, supra note 4, at 118 nn.2–3. In this respect,
Radan is in conflict with Crawford and Shaw, who assert the Temple Case is
of relevance to uti possidetis. See CRAWFORD, supra note 49, at 238–9; SHAW,
supra note 49, at 377, 380–82.
72. See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L.
1, 55 (1993).
73. RADAN, supra note 4, at 245–46.
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ciple of international law. Not only did the commission trans-
pose a colonial principle of uncertain status to a radically dif-
ferent situation – the dissolution of a sovereign state – but it
also radically transformed the principle. Whereas in the colo-
nial context uti possidetis constitutes a delimitation principle,
as applied by the Arbitration Commission it serves as an in-
consistent rule for the identification of units of statehood.
Furthermore, this new version of the uti possidetis principle is
no longer founded on the consent or contracting-in of the par-
ties involved but has become a binding solution that can be
imposed upon unwilling participants.74
Although incisive from a normative perspective, these criti-
cisms do not impact the question of whether the uti possidetis
principle has mutated, by virtue of customary international
law, to now apply in the context of UNC secession.
Examination of state practice surrounding the Yugoslav cri-
sis—the primary example of state practice relevant to the ex-
tension of uti possidetis to the non-colonial context—reveals
ambiguity and confusion on this point.75 The European Union,
for example, did not expressly endorse application of uti possi-
detis principle in official statements and discussions. Although
the U.N. Security Council stressed the importance of respecting
the existing federal borders of the various Yugoslav republics,
this is hardly surprising given its primary function of main-
taining international peace and security. Any resolutions sug-
gesting respect for federal borders must therefore be interpret-
ed with this function in mind. These considerations have led
Lalonde to argue that:
After reviewing the positions adopted by the various parties
to the Yugoslav conflict and considering the EU pronounce-
ments and Security Council Resolutions, it does not appear,
despite claims to the contrary by distinguished jurists such as
74. SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTEDWORLD:
THE ROLE OFUTI POSSIDETIS 202–03 (2002).
75. Delcourt concludes, for example, that “it is possible to argue that the
ambiguity of the positions, their fluctuating character and the confusion
which surrounded the resolution of the conflict make it difficult to consider
the Yugoslav case a precedent testifying to the extension of the uti possidetis
rule outside the decolonization situations.” Barbara Delcourt, L’application
de l’uti possidetis juris au démembrement de la Yougoslavie: règle coutumière
ou imperative politique?, in DÉMEMBREMENTS D’ÉTATS ET DELIMITATIONS
TERRITORIALES: L’UTI POSSIDETIS EN QUESTION(S) 37 (Oliver Corton et al. eds.,
1999), translated in LALONDE, supra note 74, at 194–95.
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Angelet, Nesi and Shaw, that state practice during the critical
period satisfies the material and subjective elements of cus-
tom . . . . [I]n the Nicaragua case, the International Court of
Justice, called upon to determine whether principles such as
the non-use of force and non-intervention were customary
norms, did not content itself with citing a few random treaties
and international instruments.76
It would thus seem that the application of the uti possidetis
principle to the internal administrative borders of federal
states has not yet crystallized as a definitive rule of customary
international law. Such a principle may be emerging de lege
ferenda, but it is a step too far to categorize it as a de lege lata
right. It follows that a state created by UNC secession does not,
at this point in time, have a legal obligation to follow the exist-
ing state’s internal administrative boundaries.
C. Effective Government
The effective government criterion, as traditionally under-
stood, consists of two interrelated limbs: first, there should be a
political, executive, and legal structure for the purpose of regu-
lating the population; and second, this political, executive, and
legal structure must be effective, which means that it must be
able to project authority throughout the population.77
In the second half of the twentieth century, however, the ef-
fective government criterion has been modified by the law of
self-determination. This modification—termed by Raič the
“compensatory force principle”78—has ensured that a state cre-
76. LALONDE, supra note 74, at 202.
77. See Hans M. Blix, Contemporary Aspects of Recognition, in 130
RECUEIL DES COURS 587, 633 (1970). Blix has propounded the strict satisfac-
tion of the effective government criterion, stating “[i]f . . . a [community] or-
ganization is missing, it is meaningless for the outside world to attribute
rights and obligations to the population of a State. Accordingly, a State will
not be considered to have come into being until there is an organization
which can effectively shoulder these rights and obligations,” id. at 633–34.
Compare, however, with further comments in present section relating to the
“compensatory force principle.”
78. Raič has noted that
the conclusion is inevitable that at least in cases where a colonial
people is forcibly or in any other coercive manner prevented from re-
alizing its right of self-determination, a State may come into exist-
ence under international law despite a substantial lack of effective
governmental control by the authorities of the previously colonial
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ated by UNC secession and in conformity with the right of peo-
ples to self-determination will not be required to strictly satisfy
the effective government criterion.79 Conversely, contemporary
international law indicates that a state created by UNC seces-
sion in violation of the right of peoples to self-determination
will be simply unable to satisfy the effective government crite-
rion. On this basis, it might be asserted that the effective gov-
ernment criterion has been reformulated as coextensive with
the right of peoples to external self-determination.80
1. The Compensatory Force Principle in the Colonial Context
The origins of the compensatory force principle can be traced
to the decolonization era, when new states were created pursu-
ant to the law of self-determination without strictly satisfying
the effective government criterion. Four case studies demon-
strate the operation of the principle in the colonial context: the
Republic of Congo, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. Of
these case studies, Congo and Algeria arguably represent in-
stances of consensual colonial (“CC”) secession,81 whilst Algeria
territory over the relevant territory and its inhabitants. In such sit-
uations, the lack of effective government is compensated by an appli-
cable right of external self-determination. This compensatory force of
the right of external self-determination will be referred to in this
study as the “compensatory force principle.”
The same scholar continues later in his study,
In chapter 5 it was shown that against the background of decoloniza-
tion, the applicability of the right to external self-determination re-
sults in an exclusive right or title to govern the relevant territory
and that this right may compensate for the lack of the exercise of ef-
fective governmental power (the “compensatory force principle”). The
case of Bangladesh and in particular the case of Croatia clearly show
that this principle is equally applicable beyond the context of decolo-
nization.
RAIČ, supra note 43, at 104, 364.
79. Other scholars, including Crawford, Dugard, Shaw, and Kreijen, have
alluded to this legal phenomenon, at least in the unilateral colonial secession
context. See CRAWFORD, supra note 49, at 129; JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 78–79 (1987); MALCOLM N. SHAW, TITLE TO
TERRITORY IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1986); KREIJEN, su-
pra note 41, at 142.
80. DUGARD, supra note 79, at 79.
81. Meaning secession that occurs in the colonial context with the metro-
politan power’s consent.
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and Guinea-Bissau arguably represent instances of unilateral
colonial (“UC”) secession.82 Importantly, all four case studies
represent instances of peoples exercising a valid right to exter-
nal self-determination.
a. The Republic of Congo—CC Secession
The Republic of Congo was established in 1960 after political
parties within the Belgian colony expressed their desire for in-
dependence, pursuant to the law of self-determination. After
some initial resistance to the request, Belgian authorities real-
ized that the Congolese independence movement was unable to
be suppressed without significant effort, and that even if such
an effort were to be undertaken, it would render Belgium an
international pariah. Belgium thus granted the Congo inde-
pendence in a hasty fashion on June 30, 1960.83 Upon receiving
its independence, the former colony was entirely unprepared
for its own governance. Prior to 1960, there was little formal
education beyond the age of fourteen and indigenous Congolese
held virtually no positions of executive responsibility.84
With such organizational inexperience, Congolese independ-
ence rapidly descended into political chaos. Civil order broke
down as riots gripped the major urban centers; the armed forc-
es mutinied, no longer under Brussels’ central control. Re-
markably, the Congolese government was even unable to assert
control throughout the capital, which remained gripped in an-
archy.85 In response to the situation, on July 10, 1960, Belgian
troops were deployed throughout the mineral-rich province of
Katanga, the sovereign independence of which was proclaimed
on the same day. Eventually, upon the request of the Congolese
government, the U.N. became involved in the conflict.
82. Meaning secession that occurs in the colonial context without the met-
ropolitan power’s consent.
83. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 64.
84. Id.
85. Id.; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 56; SHAW, supra note 79, at 152;
THOMAS R. KANZA, CONFLICT IN THE CONGO: THE RISE AND FALL OF LUMUMBA
190–92 (1972); ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 162–64 (1963);
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The Republic of Congo was thus devoid of effective govern-
ment in the initial period after June 30, 1960. Notwithstanding
this fact, it is clear that the Republic was regarded as a sover-
eign state post-independence by the international community,
enjoying widespread recognition and gaining admission to the
U.N. General Assembly without dissent. The U.N. also author-
ized the deployment of military force to stymie foreign inter-
vention in the Congo’s affairs, including the suppression of the
Katangese secession.86
Moreover, numerous Security Council resolutions reaffirmed
the Congo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Security
Council Resolution 145, for example, requested that states “re-
frain from any action which might undermine the territorial
integrity and the political independence of the Republic of Con-
go.”87 Security Council Resolution 169 enunciated that the U.N.
operation’s purpose was to “maintain the territorial integrity
and political independence of the Congo.”88 Similarly, General
Assembly Resolution 1474 emphasized the “unity, territorial
integrity and political independence of the Congo.”89 These acts
suggest that the Congo was regarded by the international
community as a bona fide state, despite the obvious ineffec-
tiveness of its government.90
It is apparent that the effective government criterion was lib-
erally interpreted with respect to the Congo. There are two rea-
sons which explain this turn of events. First, as Crawford has
noted, government “has two aspects: the actual exercise of au-
thority and the right or title to exercise that authority.”91 Thus,
although the Congo did not strictly fulfill the requirement of
actual exercise of authority throughout its territory, it did
nonetheless possess the right or title to exercise such authority,
by virtue of Belgium’s consensual grant of sovereignty.92 Sec-
ond, and perhaps more importantly for present purposes, the
86. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 65.
87. S.C. Res. 145, ¶2 (July 22, 1960).
88. S.C. Res. 169, ¶4 (Nov. 24, 1961).
89. G.A. Res. 1474 (ES-IV), ¶4 (Sept. 16, 1960).
90. See RAIČ, supra note 43, at 65; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 56–57.
91. Id. at 57.
92. As Crawford has stated, “[i]t is to be presumed that a new State grant-
ed full independence by a former sovereign [consensual secession] has the
international right to govern its territory – hence the United Nations action
in support of that right.” Id. at 58.
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law of self-determination operated to ensure a more liberal in-
terpretation of the effective government criterion. Raič, for ex-
ample, has noted that:
In the light of the increasing international pressure on coloni-
al powers to acknowledge the existence of a right of self-
determination of colonial peoples, there is no doubt that the
right of self-determination of the inhabitants of the Congo
was also taken into consideration by the international com-
munity in recognizing and supporting the statehood of the
Congo, that is, in addition to the Belgian grant of sovereignty
and the related existence of an exclusive right to govern the
territory. Indeed . . . in cases where a right of (external) self-
determination exists, the applicability of this right may com-
pensate for a possible lack of effective government by the enti-
ty created as a result of the exercise of that right.93
A priori, the law of self-determination reduced the threshold of
the effective government criterion.
b. Algeria—UC Secession
The example of Algeria also demonstrates the operation of
the compensatory force principle. Algeria had been a French
colony since its incorporation into the French empire in 1830.94
In 1946, France adopted a constitutional structure (the French
Fourth Republic), which was designed to facilitate the incorpo-
ration of former colonial territories into a greater union of
France. Although most French territories were entitled to pur-
sue external self-determination, this right was expressly de-
nied to Algeria, which was considered a metropolitan territory
of France.95 In 1958, when France adopted a new constitutional
order (the French Fifth Republic) Algeria’s unique status re-
mained unaltered. This unique status can be explained by two
interrelated factors: first, the presence of a strong proinde-
pendence movement within Algeria; and second, the unusually
93. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 66–67.
94. Id. at 96; see generally, ALISTAIR HORNE, A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE:
ALGERIA 1954–1962 (Viking Press 1978) (1977); DOROTHY SHIPLEY WHITE,
BLACK AFRICA AND DE GAULLE: FROM THE FRENCH EMPIRE TO INDEPENDENCE
(1979); MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION (1961);
Albert Bleckmann, Decolonization: French Territories, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 986, 986–90 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
95. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 96.
2015] Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession 27
high concentration of French businesses and French citizens
within the territory.96
The French position was not supported in international law97
and by 1961 the General Assembly had formally declared Alge-
ria to be a colonial territory entitled to external self-
determination. This led to formation of the National Liberation
Front or Front de libération nationale, an amalgamation of lib-
eration movements, which had unilaterally declared Algeria’s
independence in September 1958. A government in exile was
then established in Tunis, to receive a series of recognitions
from Arab states, Asian countries and the OAU. By April 1961,
twenty-five states had recognized Algeria.98
Saliently, at the time of these recognitions, Algeria was una-
ble to strictly satisfy the effective government criterion. Vari-
ous guerrilla groups operated throughout Algerian territory
and the French had for some time been struggling to militarily
impose order throughout the country. Furthermore, the pur-
ported government of Algeria was operating in exile from Tu-
nis. Despite this situation, Algeria was held to satisfy the effec-
tive government criterion. As with the example of the Congo,
this phenomenon can be explained by the compensatory force
principle, which allows the right of peoples to external self-
determination to predominate over the strict satisfaction of the
effective government criterion.
c. Guinea-Bissau—UC Secession
A further example from the decolonization era which high-
lights the operation of the compensatory force principle is
Guinea-Bissau.99 From the 1960s onwards, the African Party
for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, also known as
Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde
(“PAIGC”), began to use military force against the authorities
of Portugal, the metropolitan power, with the objective of
96. Id. at 97.
97. See Principles which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether
or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under
Article 73e of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), at annex, principle IV, V
(Dec. 15, 1960); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
98. BEDJAOUI, supra note 94, at 112–38.
99. See RAIČ, supra note 43, at 98–99; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 386;
SHAW, supra note 79, at 153–55; DUGARD, supra note 79, at 73–74.
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achieving independence. By the early 1970s, the PAIGC’s mili-
tary campaign had achieved tangible results, with considerable
tracts of territory wrested from Portuguese control. When a
U.N. Special Mission visited the country in 1972, it confirmed
that Lisbon had lost control of approximately two-thirds of
Guinea-Bissau’s territory, and that within these areas the
PAIGC had assumed administrative responsibility. The Portu-
guese authorities did, however, maintain control over the ur-
ban centers and vital infrastructure.
Nonetheless, in September 1973, the PAIGC declared the in-
dependence of Guinea-Bissau. After over forty states extended
Guinea-Bissau recognition,100 the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 3061, which welcomed “the recent accession to inde-
pendence of the people of Guinea-Bissau” and demanded that
“the government of Portugal desist forthwith from further vio-
lation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Repub-
lic of Guinea-Bissau.”101 This was followed one month later by
General Assembly Resolution 3181, which expressly declared
that Guinea-Bissau was an independent state.102
Guinea-Bissau was thus held to constitute a state despite the
fact that the PAIGC government could not strictly satisfy the
effective government criterion. As Raič has noted, although the
PAIGC controlled the majority of territory within the new
state, it did not control the majority of the population, which
was situated within Portuguese controlled urban areas.103 This
turn of events can be explained by the compensatory force prin-
ciple, which allows a people’s right to external self-
determination to predominate over the strict satisfaction of the
effective government criterion.
d. Angola—CC Secession
A final example from the decolonization era that demon-
strates the operation of the compensatory force principle is An-
100. DUGARD, supra note 79, at 73.
101. G.A. Res. 3061 (XXVIII), ¶ 6 (Nov. 2, 1973).
102. G.A. Res. 3181 (XXVIII), ¶ 1 (Dec. 17, 1973); see also Gerald J. Bender,
Portugal and her Colonies Join the Twentieth Century: Causes and Initial
Implications of the Military Coup, 4 UFAHAMU 121, 122, 146 (1974); J. H.
Moolman, Portuguese Guinea: The Untenable War, 12 AFR. INSTITUTE BULL.
243–60 (1974). See generally Stephanie Urdang, Towards a Successful Revo-
lution: The Struggle in Guinea-Bissau, 6 OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE 11 (1975).
103. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 99.
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gola.104 In November 1975, after a violent and protracted war of
liberation, Portugal agreed to allow Angola its independence.105
Upon assuming independence, however, there was no single
governmental authority. Rather, there were three political
groups: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola or
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (“MPLA”), the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of Angola or Frente Nacional de
Libertação de Angola (“FNLA”), and the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola or União Nacional para Inde-
pendência Total de Angola (“UNITA”). Each group was sup-
ported by various patron states: the MPLA by the Soviet Union
and Cuba; the FNLA by Zaire, the United States, and South
Africa; and UNITA by South Africa and Zambia. Not surpris-
ingly, a civil war broke out between the three factions just prior
to independence, which was in part facilitated by Lisbon allow-
ing Soviet and Cuban support on the side of the MPLA. Angola
was rapidly granted recognition by numerous states, and was
admitted to the U.N. in April 1976, after the United States de-
cided to remove its veto over Angola’s application to join the
organization.106
Critically, however, although Angola lacked any semblance of
an effective government at the time of Portugal’s withdrawal
(not to mention for decades after), it was widely regarded as a
state. This development can be explained by the compensatory
force principle, which allows a people’s right to external self-
determination to predominate over the strict satisfaction of the
effective government criterion.
104. See id. at 99–100; DUGARD, supra note 79, at 74–75; SHAW, supra note
79, at 155–56; Fausto de Quadros, Decolonization: Portuguese Territories, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 991, 991–93 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 1992); see generally JOHN A. MARCUM, THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION, EXILE
POLITICS AND GUERILLA WARFARE (1962–1976) (1978); BRUCE D. PORTER, THE
USSR IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS: SOVIET ARMS AND DIPLOMACY IN LOCAL
WARS 1945–1980 (1984); ZAKI LAЇDI, THE SUPERPOWERS AND AFRICA: THE
CONSTRAINTS OF A RIVALRY 1960–1990 (1989); John A. Marcum, Lessons of
Angola, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 407 (1976).
105. This CC secession was made possible by actions of the Armed Forces
Movement, which overthrew Marcello Caetano’s regime. Portuguese military
causalities in Africa totaled approximately eleven thousand dead and thirty
thousand wounded or disabled. See MARCUM, supra note 104, at 241; GERALD
J. BENDER, ANGOLAUNDER THE PORTUGUESE 235 (1978).
106. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 100.
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e. Conclusion
The examples of the Congo, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, and An-
gola all reveal that in the colonial context the law of self-
determination has the effect of reducing the threshold of the
effective government criterion. In this regard Raič has noted:
It must therefore be concluded that, at least in the context of
decolonization, a presumption exists in favor of the existence
of a legal rule holding that a right of external self-
determination gives rise to an exclusive right to exercise au-
thority over the (former colonial) territory once the right of
self-determination is exercised through a proclamation of in-
dependence issued by a governmental authority deemed to be
representative of the inhabitants of the territory. In turn, this
right or title to exercise authority compensates for a possible
lack of effective governmental power, certainly if such a lack
of effectiveness is a result of unlawful conduct by the parent
State, that is to say, the colonial power.107
This development is hardly surprising if one considers the im-
plications for colonial peoples if this were not the case: in effect,
metropolitan powers would be able, through the illegal use of
force, to prevent colonial peoples from realizing their right to
external self-determination.
2. The Compensatory Force Principle in the Non-Colonial Con-
text
It has been demonstrated that the law of self-determination
ensures that the strict satisfaction of the effective government
criterion is no longer necessary in the colonial context. Howev-
er the law of self-determination will also exert an analogous
effect in the context of UNC secession.108 As indicated in Part
III, the law of self-determination allows peoples who are sub-
jected to deliberate, sustained, and systematic discrimination
in extremis to pursue UNC secession as an ultimum remedium.
History reveals that states created in conformity with this
107. Id. at 102; see also supra text accompanying note 79.
108. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 364. But see SHAW, supra note 79, at 158. Shaw
argues that “[a]lthough the criterion of effective government control has been
modified by the principle of self-determination, it still exists as regards other
situations. For example, it is submitted that the rule remains intact as far as
[unilateral non-colonial] secessionist attempts are concerned, and, indeed,
with respect to divided States.” Id.
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right, such as Bangladesh, Croatia, and Kosovo, have not been
denied statehood even though they could not satisfy the effec-
tive government criterion. Conversely, attempts at UNC seces-
sion contrary to this right, such as the TRNC, Chechnya, Ab-
khazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria have simply failed to
attain statehood.109
a. Bangladesh—UNC Secession
Upon Britain’s granting of independence to Pakistan in 1947,
East Pakistan endured an uneasy relationship with West Paki-
stan. The initial issue dividing East and West Pakistan was
language. Urdu, a language almost universally unknown in
East Pakistan, and even a minority language in West Pakistan,
was named as the only official Pakistani language. In the mid-
1950s, following a succession of “language riots” throughout
Dacca, common sense prevailed, and Bengali was proclaimed
an official language alongside Urdu, temporarily alleviating
some of the tension between the two regions.110
As the Pakistani polity matured, however, it became clear
that not only were Bengalis underrepresented politically, but
that they were also denied access to important leadership posi-
tions, especially in key areas such as administration and the
armed forces. Bengali representation in all Pakistani govern-
ment services, for example, was estimated to be only 15 per-
cent, while Bengalis comprised only ten percent of the officer
corps. Of the fifty senior officers promoted to the rank of major
general or higher since 1947, only one was Bengali. Until
1956—some nineteen years after Pakistani independence—the
position of East Pakistani Governor was held exclusively by
West Pakistanis.111 Only one Bengali Cabinet minister was ap-
109. See discussion of case studies infra Part III.C.2. and Part IV.B.2.
110. RICHARD SISSON & LEO E. ROSE, WAR AND SECESSION: PAKISTAN, INDIA
AND THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH 9 (1990); Philip Oldenburg, A Place Insuf-
ficiently Imagined: Language Belief and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971, 44 J.
ASIAN STUD. 712, 715 (1985); J.N. SAXENA, SELF-DETERMINATION: FROM BIAFRA
TO BANGLA DESH 51 (1978); HERACLIDES, supra note 15, at 149; G.W.
Choudhury, Bangladesh: Why it Happened, 48 INT’L AFF. 242, 247 (1972);
CRAIG BAXTER, BANGLADESH: FROM ANATION TO A STATE 62–63 (1998).
111. BAXTER, supra note 110, at 63–65; BUCHHEIT, supra note 85, at 201;
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Bangladesh in Retrospect, 1 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 71, 75–76 (1978); SAXENA, supra
note 110 at 51.
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pointed in the fifteen years prior to Bangladeshi independence,
and this appointment lasted only four days.112
East Pakistan was also economically neglected, and by 1960
had a per capita income 30—36 percent less than the West.113
East Pakistan’s main crop, jute, was sold almost exclusively to
West Pakistan at discount prices, thereby depriving the agri-
cultural sector of its rightful earnings. A similarly exploitative
arrangement existed with East Pakistani imports: West Paki-
stan offloaded manufactured goods to Dacca at inflated pric-
es.114
Against an ongoing backdrop of tensions between East and
West Pakistan, on March 25, 1970, General Tikka Khan—the
then East Pakistani Governor—ordered his forces to leave their
barracks and embark on a systematic program of killing and
destruction, directed mainly towards East Pakistan’s civilian
population. Justice A. S. Chowdhury, Vice Chancellor of the
University of Dacca and the Pakistani member of the U.N.
Human Rights Commission, described the military operation
as an “atrocit[y] unparalleled in history.”115 When addressing
the Royal Commonwealth Society of London on June 8, 1971,
he remarked, “[i]n East Bengal today, I feel, there is no sem-
blance of civilization . . . . Under what authority of law did
these killings take place?” A British member of parliament who
visited Pakistan and India in July as a member of a British
parliamentary delegation claimed that:
[e]verywhere [in East Pakistan] we saw symptoms of a coun-
try in the grip of fear . . . . [N]ot only had the army committed
wide-spread killing and violence in the March April period,
but it still continued. Murder, torture, rape and the burning
of homes were still going on.116
On March 26, 1971, Bangladesh declared its independence
from Pakistan, making the proclamation official two weeks lat-
er on April 10.117 Bangladeshi militia forces, the Mukti Bahini,
struggled unsuccessfully to repel the West Pakistani onslaught
112. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination and International Law: The Tragic
Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66
AM. J. INT’L L. 321, 328 (1972).
113. HERACLIDES, supra note 15, at 150.
114. Id. at 149; BAXTER, supra note 110, at 67.
115. Nanda, supra note 112, at 331–32.
116. Id. at 333.
117. HERACLIDES, supra note 15, at 152.
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but nonetheless prevented a quick and decisive victory. Central
to this resistance was Indian assistance, which allowed the
Mukti Bahini to use Indian territory as a base, and provided
arms, advice, training, and supplies. This assistance precipi-
tated border skirmishes between Pakistani and Indian forces,
which culminated in open warfare between the two countries
on December 3, 1971, when Pakistani warplanes carried out a
preemptive strike on Indian airfields.118 On December 6, the
Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, responded by mounting
a full-scale military operation and announcing India’s recogni-
tion of Bangladesh as a sovereign state.119 By mid-December,
India had thoroughly routed Pakistani forces and presented the
world with a fait accompli.120
For present purposes, it is important to note that Bangla-
desh, at the time of its independence, was not self-sustaining.
Rather, it was dependent upon Indian military intervention in
order to maintain internal order. Despite this situation, it was
granted widespread recognition by early 1972.121 These recog-
nitions were forthcoming because Bangladesh satisfied the cus-
tomary right to UNC secession in international law, namely, it
was subjected to human rights violations in extremis by the ex-
isting state, Pakistan. Bangladesh’s statehood was thus expli-
cable by the compensatory force principle, which allows for the
effective government criterion to be liberally interpreted in the
context of UNC secession pursuant to the law of self-
determination.
b. Croatia—UNC Secession
In the wake of Croatian elections in which the liberal reform-
ist politician, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and the Croatian Democrat-
118. MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at 190–91 (1997); RAIČ, supra note 43, at 339;
BUCHHEIT, supra note 85, at 207.
119. Id. at 207; SAXENA, supra note 110, at 58.
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SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 147–48 (1974); BUCHHEIT,
supra note 85, at 211; HERACLIDES, supra note 15, at 157; JOYTI SEN GUPTA,
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ic Union (“HDZ”) were elected, a new Croatian Constitution
was enacted on December 22, 1990, which relegated Serbs and
other nationalities within Croatia to the status of minorities.
Serb leaders in Serbian Krajina responded by repudiating the
jurisdiction of the Croatian Department of Internal Affairs, and
began to acquire arms, declaring autonomy and unity with
Serbia.122
Tensions between Croatia and Serbia increased further when
on May 15, 1991, Serbia and its allies blocked the installation
of the Croatian Presidential candidate, Stipe Mesic, thereby
creating a constitutional crisis. This action not only created le-
gal problems, but it also left the National Yugoslav Army
(“JNA”) without a Commander-in-Chief, which left open the
possibility for partisan military officials to pursue unauthor-
ized operations with impunity. On May 19, Croatia acted deci-
sively by conducting a referendum on Croatian independence,
which was supported by an overwhelming majority of Croa-
tians.123 On June 25, the Croatian Parliament proclaimed its
independence from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugo-
slavia (“SFRY”).
The SFRY legislature reacted by labelling Croatia’s inde-
pendence illegal, and calling for the federal army to preserve
the SFRY’s territorial integrity and political unity. Battles soon
broke out between Croatian government forces and the Serbs
within Serbian Krajina. The JNA intervened under the pre-
tense of neutrality, but the federal army’s partiality soon be-
came clear: the JNA secured Serbian held positions and did not
prevent the expansion of Serbian paramilitary forces into Croa-
tian held territory.124
At this point the international community—alarmed at the
increasing violence and the potential for Yugoslav implosion—
became more involved, with the European Community (“EC”)
dispatching mediators to the conflict. After the EC Ministers
“agreed not to recognize the Slovene and Croat secessions” on
June 27, 1991, the Foreign Ministers of Luxembourg, Italy, and
122. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 339.
123. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the So-
cialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 569, 570 (1992); RAIČ,
supra note 43, at 350; Teric, supra note 8, at 418.
124. RAVI K. WADHAWAN, DISINTEGRATION OF STATES 121 (1997); RAIČ, supra
note 43, at 351; Svetozar Stojanovic, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 19
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 337, 350–51 (1995).
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the Netherlands met with Croatian and SFRY government rep-
resentatives, negotiating a cease-fire agreement, which man-
dated that in exchange for the withdrawal of JNA troops from
Croatian territory, Croatian leaders would agree to a three-
month moratorium on Croatian independence.125 This agree-
ment was formalized on July 7, 1991, at Brioni, and was subse-
quently known as the “Brioni Accord.”126 However, it soon be-
came clear that the agreement was a Pyrrhic victory, with Ser-
bian forces, supplied with weapons and logistical support from
the JNA and Serbia, continuing their military activities against
Croatian forces throughout Serbian Krajina. When Ratko
Mladic was appointed head of JNA forces in Knin, federal
troops began to openly fight alongside Serb paramilitaries.127
By August, the Serb paramilitaries and JNA were utilizing
mortars, tanks, and fighter-jets to suppress Croatia’s inde-
pendence.
The campaign undertook a more sinister turn when Serbian
forces flagrantly and repeatedly violated the fundamental hu-
man rights of Croatian civilians in Serb occupied territory. Re-
ligious and cultural objects were desecrated or destroyed, and
the “ethnic cleansing” of Croats and other nationalities inhabit-
ing the areas of Croatia in which Serbs constituted a majority,
or were tightly clustered, also took place.128 During September,
the Croatian cities of Vujovar,129 Vinkovci, and Osijek were at-
125. Alan Hanson, Croatian Independence From Yugoslavia, 1991–1992, in
WORDSOVERWAR, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENTDEADLY CONFLICT
85 (Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton, & Margaret E. McGuinness eds.,
2000).
126. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 351.
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northern Dalmatia. See id. at 352 n.159; Robert M. Hayden, Imagined Com-
munities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yu-
goslavia, 23 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 783, 795–97 (1996). See generally Drazen Pe-
trovic, Ethnic Cleansing – An Attempt at Methodology, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 342
(1994).
129. Ignatieff claims,
While the responsibility for the destruction of Vu[j]ovar lies squarely
with the tanks and artillery of the Yugoslav National Army who
lobbed 150,000 shells into the place, the Croatians also appear to
have dynamited parts of it as they withdrew, so that Serbs would
gain nothing but rubble for their pains. The pulverization of
Vu[j]ovar made no military sense.
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tacked, with no distinction between military and civilian tar-
gets, the former being almost completely destroyed. In October,
Serb forces attacked the city of Dubrovnik, which had practical-
ly no defenses.130 By November 1991 the human tragedy of
events in Croatia was apparent for all to see: six hundred thou-
sand refugees were registered in Croatia, and approximately
ten thousand people, the majority of whom were Croats, had
been killed.131
On October 3, 1991, against a backdrop of ongoing hostilities
between Serbs and Croatians, Serbian leaders seized control of
the SFRY government announcing that the collective presiden-
cy would henceforth take over responsibilities that constitu-
tionally fell within the competence of Federal Parliament. This
development, known as the “rump presidency,” was condemned
by the European Community and the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (“CSCE”).132 European governments
condemned the JNA, noting that it had “resorted to dispropor-
tionate and indiscriminate use of force” and had “shown it was
no longer a neutral and disciplined institution.”133 In light of
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW
NATIONALISM 44–45 (1993). He further notes,
It didn’t even seem to bother the largely Serb commanders that a
significant percentage of the population being bombed [in Vujovar],
perhaps as many as 20 percent, were ethnic Serbs. Now many of
them lie on the city’s outskirts beneath one of the bare, nameless
crosses in a mass grave.
Id.
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Serbian hostilities conducted against Croatia, including human
rights violations in extremis, on October 8, the day after the
expiration of the Brioni Accord, Croatia declared its independ-
ence from the SFRY.134
Croatia’s international recognition was formally delayed until
1992, due to complications associated with the secession of
member republics of the former Soviet Union, but on January
15, 1992, the European Community and its member states ex-
tended recognition. Soon thereafter, a further seventy-six
states extended recognition, and Croatia was admitted to the
U.N. on May 22, 1992.135 These recognitions were extended,
despite the fact that Croatia could not control up to one third of
its territory—i.e., the territory held by Serbs and constituting
Serbian Krajina. This was made possible by the compensatory
force principle, as Croatia’s UNC secession was concomitant
with the right of peoples to external self-determination.136
c. Kosovo—UNC Secession
A final example demonstrating the operation of the compen-
satory force principle in the non-colonial context is Kosovo.
Throughout the late-1990s Kosovar Albanians and Serbs en-
gaged in armed resistance which resulted in civilian causali-
ties. Although both sides suffered heavy losses, Serbian mili-
tary and paramilitary units “committed atrocities on a massive
and systematic scale” against Kosovar Albanians.137 Killings
and violence continued with massacres and extrajudicial execu-
tions by both sides being widely documented.138 The turning
134. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 354.
135. Id. at 356; MUSGRAVE, supra note 8, at 120; Weller, supra note 123, at
593.
136. For a discussion of the right of peoples to self-determination and UNC
secession, see supra Part II.
137. Alex J. Bellamy, Human Wrongs in Kosovo, 1974-99, in THE KOSOVO
TRAGEDY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS 105, 120 (Ken Booth ed., 2001).
Hannum notes that “[b]eginning in 1998, when the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) began its guerilla war against Serbian (Yugoslav) authorities, killing
on both sides increased; most of the victims were ethnic Albanians.” Hurst
Hannum, Book Review, 11 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 433, 438
(2004).
138. The Serbian MUP forces, for example, are thought to have killed ap-
proximately forty people in an attempt to arrest Adem Jashari, a member of
the KLA. See Bellamy, supra note 137, at 120. Human Rights Watch has
claimed that the Serbian MUP and JP in 1998 had “attacked a string of
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point in the violence was the January 1999 Račak massacre,
when Serbian paramilitaries killed and mutilated the bodies of
approximately forty-five Albanian civilians. Western press and
ceasefire monitors from the Organization for the Security and
Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”) graphically revealed the bru-
tality of the massacre to the world.139
The massacre led to NATO’s decision that the conflict could
only be resolved by large-scale military intervention, which in
turn facilitated the scheduling of the NATO-sponsored Ram-
bouillet Conference in February 1999 at the Château de Ram-
bouillet on the outskirts of Paris.140 The final document, known
as the Rambouillet Accords, provided for NATO’s administra-
tion of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia,
which would be achieved by the deployment of approximately
thirty thousand NATO troops.141 The document and its con-
tents were consistently rejected by Serbia’s political leader-
towns and villages,” concluding that “the majority of those killed and injured
have been civilians.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS
IN KOSOVO 5 (1998). The Special Rapporteur to the United Nations, Jiri
Dienstbier, in 1999 alluded to
mass expulsion and ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Ko-
sovo Albanians; killings of as-yet-untold numbers of civilians as new
mass graves continue to be discovered in Kosovo; arrest and arbi-
trary detention of several thousand Kosovo Albanians now in prison
in Serbia; systematic destruction of whole villages, neighbourhoods,
means of livelihood and the homes of selected individuals; rape as an
instrument of terror; use of landmines and depleted uranium . . . and
ethnic cleansing of nearly 200,000 non-Albanians from Kosovo.
Jiri Dienstbier (Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights),
Situation of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Republic of Croa-
tia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), ¶ 91,
U.N. Doc. A/54/396-S/1999/1000 (Sept. 24, 1999); Tesόn, supra note 120, at
376–77.
139. PAVKOVIČ, supra note 131, at 193; Bellamy, supra note 137, at 121.
140. Marc Weller, The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 75 INT’L AFFS.
211, 222–23 (1999).
141. Jure Vidmar, Kosovo: Unilateral Secession and Multilateral State-
Making, in KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT? 146–47 (James Summers ed., 2011); Sean
Murphy, Reflections on the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Interpreting Se-
curity Council Resolution 1244 (1999), in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE
KOSOVO ADVISORY OPINION 141–44 (Marko Milanovič & Michael Wood eds.,
2015).
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ship.142 NATO responded by commencing high altitude air-
strikes on March 24, 1999, which in turn prompted the Serbian
forces within Kosovo to commence a program of ethnic cleans-
ing, resulting in over three hundred thousand Kosovar Albani-
ans seeking refuge in Albania and Macedonia, with thousands
more leaving their homes to hide in the countryside. By April
1999, the U.N. estimated that 850,000 people, the majority of
whom were Albanians, had been forced from or had fled their
homes.143
The violence ended on June 12, when Serbian President Slo-
bodan Miloševič, increasingly aware of NATO’s resolve and
Russia’s unwillingness to intervene, agreed to a military pres-
ence in Kosovo incorporating NATO troops but under U.N.
headship. Shortly thereafter, the U.N. Security Council adopt-
ed resolution 1244,144 which established a new status for Koso-
vo. According to this resolution, Kosovo would technically re-
main within Yugoslavia, but would be under completely sepa-
rate administrative, political, and security arrangements, mak-
ing it akin to an independent state in all but name.
On February 17, 2008, after nearly fifteen years of fighting
and civil disorder, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a declaration
of independence, severing its links with Yugoslavia.145 Over the
following days numerous states recognized Kosovo’s independ-
ence, including the United States, Albania, Turkey, Austria,
Germany, Italy, France, Britain, and Australia. As of writing,
142. Serbian President Slobodan Miloševič reputedly slammed the Ram-
bouillet Accords, describing them as a “Clinton administration diktat,” which
paved the way for Kosovo’s eventual unilateral secession from Serbia. Lenard
J. Cohen, Kosovo: “Nobody’s Country”, 99 CURRENT HIST. 117, 117 (2000);
JOHN R. LAMPE, YUGOSLAVIA AS HISTORY: TWICE THERE WAS A COUNTRY 414
(2000); Saarilouma notes that “[t]he Yugoslav/Serbian party was clearly re-
sponsible for the failure of the negotiation process.” KATARIINA SAARILUOMA,
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: A CASE OFHUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? 24 (2004).
143. The U.N. Human Rights Commission (“UNHRC”) estimated that ap-
proximately 1,500,000 Kosovar Albanians had been forcibly displaced. See
Bellamy, supra note 137, at 121. Pavkovič puts the figure at seven hundred
thousand. PAVKOVIČ, supra note 131, at 195. Whitman puts the figure at
eight hundred thousand. Jim Whitman, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: NATO’s
Humanitarianism versus Human Rights, in THE KOSOVO TRAGEDY: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS 164, 171 (2001). Tesόn suggests a figure of ap-
proximately one million. TESΌN, supra note 120, at 378.
144. S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999).
145. Kosovo MPs Proclaim Independence, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2008, 10:45
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249034.stm.
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108 states have extended recognition. China has expressed
concern over the declaration of independence, whilst Russia
has condemned Kosovo’s statehood as illegal.146
By the time of Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, it
was apparent that in addition to political and cultural discrim-
ination Kosovar Albanians had experienced human rights
abuses in extremis, including widespread displacement and
death. Indeed some commentators have alleged genocide by
Serbs against Kosovar Albanians.147 The fact that Kosovar Al-
banians were subject to human rights abuses in extremis ac-
counts for why Kosovo’s failure in 2008 to strictly satisfy the
effective government did not prevent its attainment of state-
hood. Ultimately, Kosovo was constituted pursuant to the right
of peoples to self-determination, and was therefore able to avail
itself of the protection afforded by the compensatory force prin-
ciple.
d. Conclusion
The aforementioned case studies collectively generate two
general conclusions: first, states created by UNC secession pur-
suant to the law of self-determination do not have to strictly
satisfy the effective government criterion;148 and second, that in
146. Luke Harding, Kosovo Breakaway Illegal Says Putin, GUARDIAN (Feb.
15, 2008 06.54 AM) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249034.stm.
147. Bellamy, supra note 137, at 105; Hilaire McCoubrey, Kosovo, NATO
and International Law, 15 INT’L REL. 42 (1999); Juliane Kokott, Human
Rights Situation in Kosovo 1989-1999, in KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 1, 27 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 2002); Johan Vetlesen, The Logic
of Genocide and the Prospects of Reconciliation, in KOSOVO BETWEENWAR AND
PEACE: NATIONALISM, PEACEBUILDING AND INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP 37
(Tonny Brems Knudsen & Cartsen Bagge Laustsen eds., 2006).
148. Several other scholars similarly hold this interpretation. See, e.g.,
RAIČ, supra note 43, at 411 (“[T]he cases of Bangladesh, Croatia, Georgia, and
Moldova cannot but lead to the conclusion that the compensatory force prin-
ciple also applies beyond decolonization.”) (emphasis added); KREIJEN, supra
note 41, at 163–64. Kreijen concluded,
State practice shows that juridical statehood stretches beyond decol-
onization. This is one of the important conclusions that Raič reached
in a recent and comprehensive study of statehood and the law of self-
determination. On the basis of an extensive analysis of relevant
[non-colonial] cases, Raič established that “. . . the compensatory
force principle also applies beyond decolonization.”
Id.
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contemporary times new states can only be created pursuant to
the law of self-determination.
Having elaborated these general findings, it is apposite to
note that one case of UNC secession from the break-up of the
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, cannot be explained by the operation of the law of
self-determination and the compensatory force principle.149 On
October 14, 1991, the Bosnia-Herzegovinan parliament an-
nounced its UNC secession from the SFRY, but this was repu-
diated by Bosnia’s Serb and Croat minorities. Bosnia’s Serb
minority expressed their intention to stay within the SFRY and
created the Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which on January 9, 1992 announced the for-
mation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Republika
Srpska).150 At approximately the same time, Bosnia’s Croat
minority expressed the intention to secede from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but in the meantime established the autonomous
(but not sovereign) Croat Community of Herceg-Bonsnia in No-
vember 1991.151
Bosnia-Herzegovina reasserted its independence on Decem-
ber 24, 1991, requesting recognition from the European Com-
munity (“EC”). This was however, denied, as according to Opin-
ion No. 4 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Confer-
149. Other secessions related to the break-up of Yugoslavia, which occurred
after 1992––the date at which the SFRY is generally accepted to have en-
tered a state of dissolution and thus extinction––need not be explained by the
law of self-determination and the compensatory force principle. The secession
of Slovenia could perhaps be described as quasi-consensual. Slovenia declared
its independence on June 25, 1991, and the Yugoslav National Army (“JNA”)
substantially under the control of the Serb-dominated federal Secretariat for
National Defence, occupied strategic points in Slovenia. After a few days of
strong resistance by Slovenian militia forces, a ceasefire was agreed, known
as the Brioni Accord. Soon thereafter the federal presidency ordered the JNA
to withdraw from Slovenia. In October 1991 Slovenia again declared its inde-
pendence, and this time the JNA made no response, thereby indicating ac-
quiescence with Slovene independence. See Weller, supra note 123, at 569;
TERRETT, supra note 3, at 32. Macedonia’s secession formally occurred once
the SFRY was dissolved, thereby ensuring that no existing (parent) state re-
mained to challenge Macedonian independence. See RADAN, supra note 4, at
194–95.
150. The name “Repulblika Srpska” was adopted by the Serb Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina on August 12, 1992. See RADAN, supra note 4, at 189.
151. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 414; RADAN, supra note 4, at 187–93.
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ence on Yugoslavia152 “the will of the peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to constitute [the Republic] as a sovereign and in-
dependent State cannot be held to have been fully estab-
lished.”153 In the wake of a referendum on independence (boy-
cotted by Bosnia’s Serb minority) in which 99.4 percent of votes
were in favor of independence, fighting erupted between Bosni-
an Muslims and Bosnian-Serb irregulars and between the JNA
and Bosnian-Croat irregulars.154 Aware of these developments,
EC-member states and the United States extended recognition
to Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6 and 7, 1992, respectively.155
At this point, the fighting between the various groups within
Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified.156
For present purposes, it is important to note that at the time
of its independence, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not strictly satisfy
the effective government criterion. Various parts of the Repub-
lic’s territory were not under the Bosnian-Herzegovinian gov-
ernment’s control. Moreover, it was uncertain whether Bosnia-
Herzegovina was established pursuant to the right of peoples to
self-determination, which permits UNC secession in the con-
text of sustained and systematic human rights abuses in ex-
tremis. As Raič has noted: “the [Bosnian Muslims] were ex-
posed to serious and widespread violations of their human
rights only after the proclamation of independence.”157 It would
seem, therefore, that in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
operation of the compensatory force principle was difficult to
discern.
It might be argued, however, that the recognition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in April 1992 was made to safeguard Bosnian
Muslims in light of recent human rights abuses in Croatia, and
the Serbian posture towards Kosovo since the late-1980s.158 As
such, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s UNC secession, which was initially
rejected by EC-member states, was subsequently approved to
avoid further human rights abuses. In any event, as Raič has
noted, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s UNC secession is difficult to fit
squarely within the established law of self-determination and
152. Opinion No. 4, 31 I.L.M. 1501–1503 (1992).
153. Id. at 1503; see also RAIČ, supra note 43, at 414.
154. RADAN, supra note 4, at 187.
155. Id.
156. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 414.
157. Id. at 415–16.
158. Id. at 416.
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the concomitant compensatory force principle.159 It may be best
classified as sui generis.160
3. For How Long Might Ineffective Government Persist in the
Context of UNC Secession Pursuant to the Law of Self-
determination?
States created by UNC secession pursuant to the law of self-
determination do not have to strictly satisfy the effective gov-
ernment criterion, as the examples of the Congo, Algeria,
Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Bangladesh, Croatia, and Kosovo col-
lectively indicate. However, it must be asked if these states can
persist indefinitely in such a condition? Guidance on this ques-
tion is somewhat scant, although some general indicators can
be gleaned from the examples of the Congo, Angola, and Koso-
vo.
The facts pertaining to the Congo and Angola have been pre-
viously related. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note
that both states were created in the decolonization context pur-
suant to the law of self-determination. Furthermore, both the
Congo and Angola, although unable to strictly satisfy the effec-
tive government criterion, were held to possess statehood. The
Congo experienced civil disorder for a period of approximately
five years, until the ascendancy of Joseph-Désiré Mobuto in
1965. In Angola, ineffective government persisted for an ex-
traordinary twenty-seven years (1975–2002) as various factions
and guerrilla groups fought for supremacy. These two examples
indicate that a considerable length of time would be required
before a lack of effective government could jeopardize state-
hood. By analogy, it can be reasoned that states created by
UNC secession pursuant to the law of self-determination might
also remain without an effective government for a considerable
length of time.
In the case of Kosovo, doubts arose as to whether Pristina
could satisfy the effective government criterion. For this rea-
son, an international military presence (Kosovo Force or
KFOR), led by NATO was maintained within Kosovo to ensure
that law and order did not deteriorate and destabilize the re-
gion. It is, moreover, uncertain when this force will be com-
pletely removed and Kosovo will be able to ensure its own secu-
159. Id. at 418.
160. Id.
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rity. Yet, despite this situation, Kosovo has, at the time of writ-
ing, been recognized by 108 states. Although it is difficult to
draw any precise conclusions from this example, it does indi-
cate that states created by UNC secession pursuant to the law
of self-determination might potentially persist for many years.
At some temporal point, however, a state created by UNC se-
cession pursuant to the law of self-determination and without
an effective government may have its statehood called into
question. Precisely how long this might take is an unresolved
legal question, although extrapolation with respect to Angola
would suggest a longer time than might intuitively be as-
sumed.
C. Capacity to Enter Relations with Other States
A state created by UNC secession must have the ability to
enter relations with other states. This requires that it must po-
litically and legally represent itself to other states and within
international fora.161 Furthermore, a state created by UNC se-
cession cannot rely on any other state to enter relations or ac-
cept international responsibilities on its behalf. As Crawford
has noted, however, the criterion represents a conflation of the
effective government and independence criterions, the latter of
which is examined below.162
D. Independence
A state created by UNC secession must be independent.163
This means that its decision-making functions and other as-
161. Note though, that it does not require that a state must represent itself
to other states and international forums. See id. at 73.
162. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 62.
163. The independence criterion has been famously discussed by Judge Hu-
ber in the Islands of Palmas Case:
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exer-
cise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a
State. The development of the national organization of States during
the last few centuries, and, as a corollary, the development of inter-
national law, have established this principle of the exclusive compe-
tence of the State in regard to its own territory in such a way as to
make it the point of departure in settling most questions that con-
cern international relations.
Island of Palmas Case, 2 REP. OF INT’L ARBITRAL AWARDS 829, 838 (Apr. 4,
1928). See also CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 62; CRAWFORD, supra note 49, at
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pects of governmental organization must be exercised without
external interference by other states. Most scholars agree that
the independence criterion possesses two aspects: formal and
actual independence.164
1. Formal Independence
A state created by UNC secession is required to exhibit for-
mal independence, meaning that its powers of government are
derived from domestic law. A state created by UNC secession
must therefore be self-governing and free of both external in-
terference and control. Some indicator is typically required to
ascertain formal independence, such as the adoption of a con-
stitution, formation of a provisional government, declaration of
independence, or establishment of a sovereign legislature.
2. Actual Independence
A state created by UNC secession must also be able to
demonstrate actual independence, meaning that its decisions
and actions must be its own. This requirement ensures that
statehood is bona fide, and “not a mere fiction.”165 Thus, a state
purportedly created by UNC secession will not exist if it rou-
tinely acquiesces to the directives of another state. Similarly, a
state purportedly created by UNC secession will not exist if le-
gal decisions and legislation promulgated in another state are
applicable throughout its territory and it does not voluntarily
accede to such decisions and legislation.
A state purportedly created by UNC secession under belliger-
ent occupation will also fail the test of actual independence. An
example of the foregoing is provided by Manchukuo, a puppet
state created by the Japanese military in 1931 throughout the
Chinese province of Manchuria. A fact-finding body established
by the League of Nations, known as the Lytton Commission,
found that “[t]he independence movement, which had never
been heard of in Manchuria before September 1931, was only
made possible by the presence of Japanese troops and for this
129–30; KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 161–90 (1954).
164. MAREK, supra note 163, at 165–80; RAIČ, supra note 43, at 75; JORRI
DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-
STATES 122 (1996).
165. MAREK, supra note 163, at 169.
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reason cannot be considered to have been called into existence
by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement.”166
This report further stated:
A group of Japanese civil and military official conceived . . .
the Manchurian independence movement as a solution to the
situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of Sep-
tember 18, and, with this object, made use of the names and
actions of certain Chinese individuals and took advantage of
certain minorities and native communities that had grievanc-
es against the Chinese administration. This movement, which
rapidly received assistance and direction from the Japanese
general staff, could only be carried through owing to the pres-
ence of the Japanese troops. It cannot be considered as a
spontaneous and genuine independence movement. The main
political and administrative power in the “Government” of
“Manchukuo” . . . rests in the hands of Japanese officials and
advisors, who are in a position actually to direct and control
the administration in general. The Chinese in Manchuria,
who . . . form the vast majority of the population do not sup-
port this “Government” and regard it as an instrument of the
Japanese.167
It follows that a state created by UNC secession, designed to
conceal the sovereign control of another state, will not satisfy
the test of actual independence.168 In such cases, the sovereign-
ty of the occupied existing state purportedly rendered extinct—
whether in part or whole—will remain intact throughout the
territory concerned and be exercisable with the cessation of bel-
ligerent occupation. This is a logical extension of the continuity
doctrine, which assumes a state’s juridical existence even if it
has been purportedly rendered extinct.169
166. Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of En-
quiry, League of Nations Doc. C.663.M.320.1932.VII (1932).
167. Id.
168. Marek has described a puppet state as, “an entity which, while pre-
serving all the external paraphernalia of independence, is in fact utterly lack-
ing such independence . . . and is in reality . . . a mere organ of the State
which has set it up, whose . . . satellite it is.” MAREK, supra note 163, at 170.
Crawford has defined the term thus: “[t]he term ‘puppet State’ is used to de-
scribe nominal sovereigns under effective foreign control, especially in cases
where the establishment of the puppet State is intended as a cloak for illegal-
ity.” CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 78.
169. Id. at 169–70; RAIČ, supra note 43, at 78; Josef L. Kunz, Identity of
States Under International Law, 49 AM. J. INT’L L. 68, 70 n.8 (1955).
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A more recent example of a state purportedly created by UNC
secession but lacking actual independence is Serbian Krajina.
During June 1991, the Yugoslav National Army (“JNA”) inter-
vened in Croatia as a result of hostilities between the Croatian
police forces and Serbian militants, which erupted after the
Croatian declaration of independence on June 25, 1991. Alt-
hough the JNA claimed to be taking a neutral position, pre-
venting both sides from fighting each other, the federal army
actually prevented the reestablishment of Croatian control over
territory forming Serbian Krajina. In effect, Serbian Krajina
was created by the JNA, which was controlled by Serbian lead-
ership.170
Coupled with this, Serbian Krajina appeared to be politically
under the influence of Serbia, as evidenced by its vacillating
position regarding the establishment of U.N. Protected Areas
(“UNPAs”) under the Vance peace-plan.171 Although the leader-
ship of Serbian Krajina initially opposed the establishment of
UNPAs, which were formally described as “areas in Croatia,”
such leaders subsequently reversed course after Serbian Presi-
dent Slobodan Miloševič approved their creation. To a certain
extent then, Serbian Krajina appeared to be under Serbia’s po-
litical control.172 As Crawford has observed, actual independ-
ence cannot be achieved where there is “foreign control over-
bearing the decision-making of [an] entity . . . on a wide range
of matters . . . .”173
Another example from the break-up of Yugoslavia of a state
purportedly created by UNC secession and lacking formal in-
dependence is the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Re-
publika Srpska). The Republic was declared on April 7, 1992
throughout various territorial enclaves now forming part of
170. The former President of Serban Krajina, Milan Babić, testified to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that Serbian Kraj-
ina was under the political and economic control of Serbian President, Slo-
bodan Milošević. This included the JNA. See JUDITH ARMATTA, TWILIGHT OF
IMPUNITY: THEWARCRIMES TRIAL OF SLOBODANMILOSEVIC 160–63 (2010).
171. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 79–80. For information on the Vance peace-
plan, which is named after Cyrus Vance, see generally Amy Lou King, Bos-
nia-Herzengovina-Vance-Owen Agenda for a Peaceful Settlement: Did the UN
Do Too Little, Too Late, to Support This Endeavor?, 23 GA. J. INT’L&COMP. L.
347 (1993).
172. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 80.
173. CRAWFORD, supra note 49, at 130.
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. In The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić,174 the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) alluded to the failure of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to exercise actual inde-
pendence, noting:
[T]he fact that it was the FRY that had the final say regard-
ing the undertaking of international commitments by the Re-
publika Srpska, and in addition pledged, at the end of the
conflict, to ensure respect for those international commit-
ments by the Republika Srpska, confirms that (i) during the
armed conflict the FRY exercised control over that entity, and
(ii) such control persisted until the end of the conflict.175
The Serb Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina thus lacked actual
independence, as its armed forces and political commitments
were under Belgrade’s direct control. This necessarily prevent-
ed the Republic from attaining statehood.
A final example of a state purportedly created by UNC seces-
sion, but lacking actual independence, is Crimea. Towards the
end of 2013, mass protests occurred in Ukraine in response to
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to postpone
the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. This
postponement was brought about by political inducements from
Russia, with offers from Russian President Vladamir Putin to
sell discounted gas to Ukraine, and also purchase $15 billion in
Ukrainian bonds.176 These moves were designed to prevent
closer integration between Ukraine and Europe, which Putin
and other Russian elites feared would lead to closer military
integration, most notably, Ukraine’s accession to NATO.177
174. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
175. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 81–82 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case IT-94-
1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 145, 147, 154, 160 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia July 15, 1999)).
176. Russia Offers Ukraine Major Economic Assistance, BBC NEWS (Dec. 17,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25411118; Christopher R. Ros-
si, Ex Injuria Jus Non Oritur, Ex Factis Jus Oritur, and the Elusive Search
for Equilibrium After Ukraine, 24 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 143–44
(2015).
177. David M. Herszenhorn, Facing Russian Threat, Ukraine Halts Plans
for Deals with E.U., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), http://nyti.ms/1AXKwQw;
Neil MacFarquhar, Early Memo Urged Moscow to Annex Crimea, Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015), http://nyti.ms/18kQOPy; John Mearsheim-
er, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that
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Ukraine’s popular voice, however, was in favor of closer ties
with Europe. Discontent towards Yanukovych’s pro-Russian
policies culminated in the deaths of antigovernment protesters
in January—February 2014. On February 22, Yanukovych fled
Kiev amidst allegations of corruption and complicity in the kill-
ing of antigovernment protesters.178 A political power vacuum
ensued, and Russian special forces moved into Crimea to take
up strategic positions and organize local resistance.179 Russian
forces massed on the Ukrainian border, conducting military
exercises and preparing for the possibility of a full-scale inva-
sion. Crimea’s UNC secession was proclaimed, but considerable
doubt exists over the lack of actual control exerted by Crimean
authorities during this period.
A referendum, unrecognized by all but a handful of states,
was instituted to legitimize the preceding military activities.180
Rather ominously, Russian military forces remained within
Crimea during the referendum.181 These measures paved the
Provoked Putin, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 79; Adam Twardowski,
Return of Novorossiya: Why Russia’s Intervention in Ukraine Exposes the
Weakness of International Law, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L. 351, 356–59 (2015).
178. William Booth & Will Englund, Ukraine's Yanukovych Missing as Pro-
testers Take Control of Presidential Residence in Kiev, WASH. POST (Feb. 22,
2014), http://wpo.st/EEr-1.
179. Lawrence Freedman, Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management, 56
SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. & STRATEGY 9, 21–22, 30 (2014).
180. The referendum failed to provide a status quo option for voters, instead
only offering integration with Russia or remaining with Ukraine. See Stephen
Tierney, Sovereignty and Crimea: How Referendum Democracy Complicates
Constituent Power in Multinational Societies, 16 GERMAN L.J. 523, 534–35
(2015); Adam Šućur, Observing the Question of Secession in the Wake of Re-
cent Events in Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea, 3 ZAGREBAČKA
PRAVNA REVIJA 273, 296 (2015); Christian Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis: An
International Law Perspective, 74 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 367, 380–83 (2014);
Peter Hilpold, Ukraine, Crimea and New International Law: Balancing In-
ternational Law with Arguments Drawn from History, 14 CHINESE J. INT’L L.
237, 258–62 (2015).
181. David M. Herszenhorn, Crimea Votes to Secede From Ukraine as Rus-
sian Troops Keep Watch, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1fAThkg;
Tierney, supra note 180, at 528–29; Brad Roth, The Virtues of Bright Lines:
Self-Determination, Secession, and External Intervention, 16 GERMAN L.J.
384, 390 (2015); Amandine Catala, Secession and Annexation: The Case of
Crimea, 16 GERMAN L.J. 581, 602 (2015). For acknowledgement of the close
historical ties between Crimea and Russia, see Henry A. Kissinger, To Settle
the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://wpo.st/gNT81.
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way for Crimea’s integration into Russia on March 18, 2014.182
Allegations of direct Russian military aggression have contin-
ued, most notably with the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH 17 by Russian made Buk missiles on July 17, 2014.183 Rus-
sian military involvement thus suggests that Crimea was not a
case of UNC secession followed by integration with Russia, but
rather a case of belligerent occupation and annexation. Crimea
thus lacked actual independence.
E. Summation of Criteria for Statehood Based on Effectiveness
In relation to the defined territory criterion, a state created
by UNC secession must claim a specific territory and maintain
allegiance to that claim’s specific nature. Furthermore, such a
state will not necessarily be required to follow the existing
state’s internal administrative boundaries. A priori, the appli-
cation of the uti possidetis principle beyond the decolonization
context has not yet crystallized into a definitive rule of interna-
tional law.
A state created by UNC secession pursuant to the law of self-
determination will not, by virtue of the compensatory force
principle, be required to strictly satisfy the effective govern-
ment criterion.184 In the state creation context, therefore, the
effective government criterion has been reformulated as equiv-
alent to the right of peoples to external self-determination.185
In relation to the independence criterion, a state created by
UNC secession must demonstrate formal and actual independ-
ence. The former requires that the state created manifests the
formal hallmarks of independence, while the latter requires the
absence of political control by other states.
It remains to be ascertained, however, whether a state creat-
ed by UNC secession must satisfy another criterion, namely,
recognition.
182. Steven Myers & Peter Baker, Putin Recognizes Crimea Secession, Defy-
ing the West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1gF8TEj.
183. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, What Would it Take to Shoot Down MH17?,
WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), http://wpo.st/2x501; Malaysia Airlines MH17:
Missile Expert Arrested Near Border, Ukraine Government Says, ABC NEWS
ONLINE (July 18, 2014, 6:04 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-
19/ukraine-government-says-missile-expert-arrested-near-border/5608744.
184. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 104, 364; CRAWFORD, supra note 49, at 129;
SHAW, supra note 49, at 149; DUGARD, supra note 79, at 78–79.
185. Id. at 79.
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IV. RECOGNITION ANDUNC SECESSION: AN ADDITIONAL
CRITERION FOR STATEHOOD?
The legal interrelationship between recognition and UNC se-
cession varies according to the particular recognition theory
preferred. The declaratory recognition theory postulates that
when one state recognizes another, this is merely an acknowl-
edgement of a preexisting factual situation (recognition does
not confer statehood, but merely acknowledges it). The consti-
tutive recognition theory postulates that when one state recog-
nizes another, this acknowledgement actually confers state-
hood (a state cannot exist without the conferral of recognition).
The constitutive-collective recognition theory suggests that ad-
mission to the U.N. represents the collective conferral of state-
hood (a state cannot exist until it is admitted to the U.N.).186
According to the declaratory theory, the process of UNC se-
cession will be completed prior to any subsequent grant of
recognition. The constitutive theory, by contrast, holds that the
process of UNC secession can only be completed by the confer-
ral of recognition itself. The constitutive-collective theory sug-
gests that the process of UNC secession can only be completed
by admission to the U.N.
However, before commencing a detailed analysis of the rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses of the declaratory, constitutive,
and constitutive-collective recognition theories, it is first neces-
sary to briefly consider whether any special rules apply to the
recognition of states created by UNC secession as opposed to
already existing states.
A. A Lex Specialis for Recognition in the Context of UNC Seces-
sion?
Pufendorf maintained that the existing state’s recognition
was necessary for a secessionist entity to obtain statehood.187 A
priori, an entity created by consensual or unilateral secession
must enjoy the existing state’s recognition before statehood
could be legally conferred. Other early scholars, however, such
186. This has also been termed the constitutive-cum-collective recognition
theory. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 9, 20–21 (1991).
187. See CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 376.
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as Vattel, took a different view, arguing that the existing
state’s recognition was unnecessary.188
The debate between these two positions was resolved in the
context of the independence of the former Spanish colonies in
South America. From 1809 onwards, various Spanish colonies
declared their independence from Madrid and functioned with-
out any effective Spanish opposition for over a decade. Madrid,
despite its lack of effective opposition, maintained a policy of
refusing to extend recognition to its purported South American
territories. In June 1822, contrary to Spanish desires, U.S.
President James Monroe extended recognition to Colombia.
Similarly, the British extended recognition to Argentina in
February 1825, Colombia in April 1825, and Mexico in Decem-
ber 1826.189 These recognitions occurred without Madrid’s con-
sent and thus established that in cases of UC secession, the ex-
isting state’s recognition is unnecessary.
State practice from the twentieth century also indicates that
in context of UC secession the existing state’s recognition is
unnecessary, namely, Algeria’s recognition prior to French
recognition, Guinea-Bissau’s recognition prior to Portuguese
recognition, and Indonesia’s recognition prior to Dutch recogni-
tion.190
State practice from the twentieth century analogously indi-
cates that in context of UNC secession, the existing state’s
recognition is unnecessary, namely, Bangladesh’s recognition
prior to Pakistani recognition, the recognition of Slovenia, Cro-
atia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia prior to Yugoslav
recognition, and Kosovo’s recognition prior to Serbian recogni-
tion.191
Thus, once an entity created by UNC secession has satisfied
the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness, it is unneces-
sary that the existing state also confers recognition.192 As Raič
has noted, “under modern international law a new territorial
entity, created by secession, may acquire full international per-
sonality originally and independently, that is, without the ne-
cessity of a transfer of sovereignty by the predecessor State.”193
188. Id.
189. Id. at 377.
190. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 93–94.
191. Id.
192. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 382.
193. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 94.
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It follows that there is no lex specialis for recognition in the
context of UNC secession.
B. Evaluation of Recognition Theories
It is now well settled in scholarly discourse that the declara-
tory theory, rather than the constitutive, is the more correct
approach to recognition. This position is borne out by consider-
ation of treaty law, customary law, judicial decisions, and
scholarly opinion.
With respect to treaty law, the Montevideo Convention,
signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 26, 1933, in Arti-
cle 3 enumerates that:
The political existence of the State is independent of recogni-
tion by the other States. Even before recognition, the State
has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to pro-
vide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to
organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests,
administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and
competence of its courts.
A priori, recognition does not confirm statehood, as propounded
by the constitutive school, but instead statehood antedates
recognition.194
The Charter of the Organization of American States (“OAS”)
similarly suggests that the declaratory theory is correct, with
Article 13 affirming that “[t]he political existence of the State is
independent of recognition by other States.” Article 14 supple-
ments this position, declaring that “[r]ecognition implies that
the State granting it accepts the personality of the new State,
with all the rights and duties that international law prescribes
for the two States.” Both treaties thus support the declaratory
view, and this approach is, by virtue of the quasicontractual
nature of treaty law, binding upon signatory states.195
No treaty law can be marshalled to support the constitutive
recognition theory. It has been suggested, however, that Arti-
194. See P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BASIC PRINCIPLES 13 (1994).
195. Id. at 14; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
The content of Article 26 is also reflective of customary international law. See
Pulp Mills on the River Uraguay (Arg. v Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 67, ¶
145 (Apr. 20).
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cles 4(1) and 4(2) of the U.N. Charter might provide support for
the constitutive-collective recognition theory, if read so as to
mean that admission to the U.N. is coterminous with the con-
ferral of statehood by collective means. However, this argu-
ment cannot be sustained as the Charter’s travaux prépa-
ratoires reveals that a Norwegian proposal to provide the U.N.
with the ability to recommend collective recognition of state-
hood was rejected.196 As observed by Aufricht: “it was the inten-
tion of the authors of the Charter not to interpret admission to
membership as equivalent to collective recognition of States or
governments.”197
With respect to customary law, state practice indicates the
correctness of the declaratory approach. In December 1974 the
General Assembly adopted the nonbinding Definition of Ag-
gression,198 Article 1 of which provided that “[a]gression is the
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territori-
al integrity or political independence of another State,” where
“the term ‘State’ . . . [i]s used without prejudice to questions of
recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United
Nations.” Article 1 thus suggests that states can exist regard-
less of whether they enjoy recognition from other states, or are
members of the U.N. A priori, the Definition of Aggression,
which was adopted by consensus, comports with the fundamen-
tal tenets of the declaratory recognition theory.
Other incidents of state practice also suggest that nonrecog-
nized states are not to be necessarily regarded as stateless en-
tities.199 When Israeli fighter jets shot down British aircraft
196. United Nations Conference on International Organization, Amend-
ments and Observations on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal, Submitted by the
Norwegian Delegation, U.N. Doc. 2 G/7(n)(1) (May 3, 1945), in 3 DOC. U.N.
CONF. INT’LORG. 366 (1945).
197. Hans Ausfricht, Principles and Practice of Recognition by International
Organizations, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 691, 691 (1949).
198. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).
199. See Robert D. Sloane, The Changing Face of Recognition in Interna-
tional Law: A Case Study of Tibet, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 107, 117 (2002).
Crawford asserts that
[t]he question is whether the denial of recognition to an entity oth-
erwise qualifying as a State entitles the non-recognizing State to act
as if it was not a State – to ignore its nationality, to intervene in its
affairs, generally to deny the exercise of State rights under interna-
tional law. The answer must be no, and the categorical constitutive
position, which implies a different answer, is unacceptable.
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over Egypt in January 1949, for example, the British govern-
ment demanded compensation from Israel, despite not having
granted the latter recognition. Accordingly, the British gov-
ernment regarded the state of Israel as an incontrovertible re-
ality, and did not take the view that recognition was constitu-
tive of statehood.200 Similarly, many Arab states repeatedly
claimed that Israel had violated the U.N. Charter, and at-
tempted to make claims against the Israeli government, de-
spite withholding recognition. Similar disputes have historical-
ly occurred between North and South Korea, both of which, for
a time, refused to recognize the other.201 These examples
strongly suggest that recognition is declaratory of statehood.
More recently, the breakup of the SFRY has provided further
support for the declaratory recognition theory. With respect to
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on May 2, 1992,
EC member states declared that, “[t]hey are willing to recog-
nize that State as a sovereign and independent State, within its
existing borders, and under a name that can be accepted by all
parties concerned.”202 From this statement, it emerges that EC
member states regarded the Republic of Macedonia as a state
—not a “territorial entity” or “putative state”—prior to receiv-
ing the recognition of EC member states. A similar situation
occurred with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), which was established in 1992, but
only granted recognition in 1996. During the four years prior to
receiving recognition, it was clear from various diplomatic
statements that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was “re-
garded as a state under international law.”203
Support for the declaratory recognition theory can be found
within various judicial decisions. The Badinter Arbitration
Commission (BAC), established to advise the European Peace
CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 27.
200. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 36 n.73.
201. DIXON, supra note 46, at 133.
202. RAIČ, supra note at 43, at 36 n.73 (alteration in original) (quoting Dec-
laration on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, U.N. Doc. S/23880
(May 2, 1992)).
203. See, e.g., Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, Declaration con-
cerning the Need for Undertaking Urgent and Immediate Steps With Respect
to Yugoslavia, in YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS: FROM ITS CREATION TO
ITS DISSOLUTION 577–78 (Snežana Trifunovska ed., 1994); Resolution 1/6-Ex
on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Doc. A/47/765 – S/24930
Annex III (Dec. 10, 1992); RAIČ, supra note 43, at 36–37, n.73.
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Conference on Yugoslavia, in its Opinion No. 1,204 delivered on
November 29, 1991, stated that “the effects of recognition by
other states are purely declaratory.”205 This position was ech-
oed by the BAC’s Opinion No. 8,206 delivered on July 4, 1992,
which provided that “recognition of a State by other States has
only declarative value . . . . ”207 In the BAC’s Opinion No. 10,208
also delivered on July 4, 1992, this view was reaffirmed:
“recognition is not a prerequisite for the foundation of a State
and is purely declaratory in its impact.”209 The BAC thus held
that statehood is crystallized irrespective of any acts of recogni-
tion.
Further judicial support for the declaratory recognition theo-
ry can be found within the Canadian Supreme Court advisory
opinion, Reference re Secession of Quebec:210
Secession of a province from Canada, if successful in the
streets, might well lead to the creation of a new
state. Although recognition by other states is not, at least as a
matter of theory, necessary to achieve statehood, the viability
of a would-be state in the international community depends,
as a practical matter, upon recognition by other states. That
process of recognition is guided by legal norms. However, in-
ternational recognition is not alone constitutive of statehood
and, critically, does not relate back to the date of secession to
serve retroactively as a source of a “legal” right to secede in
the first place. Recognition occurs only after a territorial unit
has been successful, as a political fact, in achieving seces-
sion.211
Although the court noted that recognitions would be politically
beneficial for a newly seceded Quebec, it refrained from assert-
ing that these were a sine qua non for statehood. The court
therefore held that the declaratory recognition theory was to be
preferred to the constitutive.212
204. Arbitration Comm’n Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494–1495 (1992).
205. Id. at 1495 (emphasis added); see CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 24.
206. Arbitration Comm’n Opinion No. 8, 31 I.L.M. 1521–1523 (1992).
207. Id. at 1521 (emphasis added); see CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 399.
208. Arbitration Comm’n Opinion No. 10, 31 I.L.M. 1525–1526 (1992).
209. Id. at 1526; see RAIČ, supra note 43, at 37, n.74.
210. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217.
211. Id. ¶142.
212. Raič claims that “[t]he Canadian Supreme Court rejected the constitu-
tive theory in Reference re Secession of Quebec.” RAIČ, supra note 43, at 37
n.77.
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The Bosnian Genocide Case213 provides further support for
the declaratory theory. In that case it was argued by the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”) that the ICJ was unable to
adjudicate claims on the Genocide Convention, because the
FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina had not recognized each other at
the time legal proceedings were initiated. This argument was
rejected on the grounds that mutual recognition had subse-
quently been granted in the General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Dayton Accord”),214 and
that any chronological defects could be rectified by refiling the
claim after this time.215 This reasoning suggests that the rights
of Bosnia-Herzegovina were counterposed to those of the FRY
from the time the former became a state in fact, despite the
lack of recognition between the two parties.216 It follows that
the ICJ rejected the constitutive recognition theory and en-
dorsed the declaratory position that statehood can crystallize
irrespective of recognition.217
Considerable support for the declaratory recognition theory
can also be found within scholarly opinion. Chen, for example,
has argued that “whenever a State in fact exists, it is at once
subject to international law, independently of the wills or ac-
tions of other States.”218 Crawford has similarly observed:
[The Declaratory] position has the merit of avoiding the logi-
cal and practical difficulties involved in the constitutive theo-
ry, while still accepting a role for recognition as a matter of
practice. It has the further, essential, merit of consistency
with that of practice, and is supported by a substantial body
of opinion.219
Crawford later continues that “States do not in practice regard
unrecognized States as exempt from international law; indeed
failure to comply with international law is sometimes cited as a
213. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11).
214. The Agreement was finalized on December 14, 1995.
215. Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, I.C.J. 1996 at 612–14.
216. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 25.
217. Id.
218. TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION: WITH
SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PRACTICE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
14 (1951).
219. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 22–23.
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justification for non-recognition . . . . Recognition is usually in-
tended as an act, if not of political approval, at least of political
accommodation.”220 Cassese also supports the declaratory
recognition theory, criticizing the constitutive position on three
grounds, namely, its conflict with the international legal prin-
ciple of effectiveness, its deleterious implications for the sover-
eign equality of states, and the potential for a state to simulta-
neously be both existent and nonexistent:
Many jurists, chiefly in the past, have advocated the view
that recognition entails “constitutive” effects, namely, that it
creates the legal personality of States. This view is, however,
fallacious because it is in strident contradiction with the prin-
ciple of effectiveness whereby “effective” situations are fully
legitimized by international law (according to the theory of
constitutive recognition a State would not possess legal per-
sonality if not recognized, even where it possessed effective-
ness). Furthermore it is inconsistent with the principle of the
sovereign equality of States, for existing States would be au-
thorized to decide when a new entity exhibiting all the hall-
marks of a State may or may not be admitted to membership
of the world community. The theory is also logically unsound,
for it implies that a certain entity is an international subject
in relation to those states which have recognized it, while it
lacks legal personality as far as other States are concerned;
thus the international personality would be split quite artifi-
cially, in defiance of reality.221
Numerous other scholars have propounded analogous views.222
220. Id. at 26.
221. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 73–75 (2d ed. 2005).
222. DIXON, supra note 46, at 133–36; MALANCZUK, supra note 47, at 84;
John Fischer Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in In-
ternational Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 776, 778–79 (1934); ALEXANDER
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 372–73
(Vaughan Lowe ed., 2006); LOUIS L. JAFFÉ, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS; IN PARTICULAR OF THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN POWERS 97–98
(Johnson Reprint Corp., 1968) (1933); Edwin M. Borchard, Recognition and
Non-recognition, 36 AM. J. INT’L L. 108 (1942); Rafael W. Erich, La naissance
et la reconnaissance des états, 13 RECUEIL DES COURS 427, 461 (1926); see
Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 YALE
L.J., June 1944, at 385, 424; ALEXANDRE MÉRIGNHAC, TRAITÉ DE DROIT PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL 328 (F. Pinchon & Durand-Auzias eds., 1905); ALAN JAMES,
SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 147–148 (1986);
Karl Doehring, State, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 600,
604 (Rudolf Bernhardt, ed. 2000); Philip Marshall Brown, The Effects of
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C. Conclusion
The declaratory recognition theory is superior to the constitu-
tive. Accordingly, statehood can antedate recognition, and is
prima facie achieved by compliance with the criteria for state-
hood based on effectiveness, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, an effective government (as modified by the
law of self-determination), the capacity to enter into relations
with other states, and independence.223
As a result of this determination, it can be argued that prima
facie, the process of UNC secession is lawfully accomplished
when the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness manifest
in fact. A state created by UNC secession does not, therefore,
require recognition—either from the existing state or other
states—to be distinguished from a mere secessionist move-
ment.
This is not, of course, to deny the obvious political salience of
recognition. Radan, for example, has noted that “[h]istorically,
international recognition of statehood has been the major for-
eign policy goal of any secessionist movement.”224 States thus
enhance their status by attaining recognition, opening the pos-
sibility of reciprocal diplomatic relations and political alliances
Recognition, 36 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 106, 107 (1942); Josef L. Kunz, Critical Re-
marks on Lauterpacht’s “Recognition in International Law,” 44 AM. J. INT’L L.
713 (1950); MAREK, supra note 163, at 130–61; M. Lachs, Recognition and
Modern Methods of International Co-operation, BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 252, 258
(1959); HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 135–36; D.P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 81, 128–34 (2d ed. 1970); J. E. S. Fawcett, THE LAW OF NATIONS 49, 55
(2d ed. 1971); J. S. Davidson, Beyond Recognition, 32 NORTHERN IRELAND
LEGAL Q. 22, 22–23 (1981); MENON, supra note 194, at 13; Donald A. Heydt,
Note, Non-recognition and the Independence of Transkei, 10 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 167, 184–85 (1978); Colin Warbrick, Recognition of States: Recent
European Practice, in ASPECTS OF STATEHOOD AND INSTITUTIONALISM IN
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 9 (Malcolm Evans ed., 1997); Jure Vidmar, Conceptu-
alizing Declarations of Independence and International Law, 32 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 153, 159–60 (2011).
223. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 38–93. Crawford states in this regard,
“[R]ecognition is not a condition for statehood in international law . . . .
Rights under international law are not contingent upon the acceptance of the
right-holder by individual others. An entity is not a State because it is recog-
nized; it is recognized because it is a State.” Id. at 93. Raič has similarly ob-
served “the declaratory theory best reflects customary international law.”
RAIČ, supra note 43, at 37 n.77.
224. RADAN, supra note 4, at 22.
60 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
with other recognized, well-established, and often powerful
states.225
An example of the practical importance of recognition is pro-
vided by Biafra, a state created by UNC secession pursuant to
the law of self-determination. Biafra was ultimately unable to
secure the recognition of powerful states, particularly Britain
and France, in order to effectively guarantee its future inde-
pendence. Without the recognition of powerful states, Biafra
entered into a legal “grey” zone, arguably possessing nascent
statehood, only to be gradually reabsorbed back into Nigeria by
a process of ongoing warfare.
Recognition is therefore politically and practically important
to any state created by UNC secession, although, in terms of
strict legal doctrine, it is not a sine qua non for statehood.226 In
particular, one type of recognition has unparalleled practical
benefits, namely, where the existing state grants recognition.
This special type of recognition expressly signals to other states
that recognition of the state created by UNC secession is with-
out adverse diplomatic or political consequences, thereby serv-
ing to buttress the secessionist state’s practical viability.227
Given that the declaratory theory is accepted as correct, it
thus becomes necessary to consider the modern criteria for
statehood based on compliance with peremptory norms, as
there are various examples of UNC secessionist entities which
have not been considered by the international community to
possess statehood. Some of these examples include the TRNC,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria which will be ac-
counted for below.
IV. UNC SECESSION AND THE CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD BASED
ON COMPLIANCE WITH PEREMPTORYNORMS
Before assessing the precise impact of peremptory norms on
states created by UNC secession, it is first necessary to briefly
discuss the nature of such norms and their applicability to ter-
ritorial situations.
225. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 27.
226. Id. at 93.
227. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 93–94.
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A. Peremptory Norms and their Applicability to Territorial Sit-
uations
Peremptory norms (jus cogens) can be characterized as “com-
pelling law” and can be juxtaposed with jus dispositivum,
meaning law “subject to the dispensation of the parties.”228
Peremptory norms are therefore immutable legal rules, mean-
ing that it is impossible for states to exclude their operation, or
to derogate from their requirements. After controversy during
the mid-twentieth century as to whether peremptory norms
existed in international law, Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulated:
A treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character.229
Article 53 thus provided that peremptory norms existed de lege
lata, and that such norms were nonderogable legal rules that
could not be violated by treaty law.230 Article 53 did not, how-
228. Orakhelashvili has observed that “rules of jus cogens have to apply
whatever the will and attitude of States, while the applicability of the rules of
jus dispositivum can be excluded or modified in accordance with the duly ex-
pressed will of States.” ORAKHELASHVILI, supra, note 222, at 8–9.
229. Article 53 was repeated ad literatim by Article 53 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organiza-
tions or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. See Gennady M. Danilenko, International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law
Making, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 42, 42 (1991).
230. There are two overlapping schools of thought as to the content or scope
of peremptory norms. According to the “substantive” school, peremptory
norms are substantive rules of international law from which no derogation is
permitted. According to this view, structural rules, such as pacta sunt
servanda and pacta tertiis, which operate in the context of treaty law, are
excluded. The “systemic” school, by contrast, defines peremptory norms as
including substantive norms from which no derogation is permitted and
structural rules. For proponents of the substantive school, see, inter alia,
Orakhelashvili, who has argued “structural norms cannot be peremptory . . .
.” ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 222, at 45. Crawford has propounded, “[I]n
discussing the problem of peremptory norms we are concerned only with
what may be called substantive, not with structural rules.” CRAWFORD, supra
note 2, at 100. See also RAIČ, supra note 43, at 142–43; Hubert Thierry,
62 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
ever, provide assistance on the categorization of peremptory
norms, nor the applicability of such norms outside the treaty
law context. In relation to the former, although there is some
variance among scholars on the categorization of peremptory
norms,231 there is widespread agreement that certain norms
L’évolution du droit international––Cours général de droit international pub-
lic, 222 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 66–70 (1990); Alfred Verdross, Jus Disposi-
tivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 55, 59 (1966);
Jochen A. Frowein, Ius Cogens, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW ¶ 6 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2013); Ulrich Scheuner, Conflict of Treaty
Provisions with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law and Its
Consequences, 28 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDICHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VÖLKERRECHT 520, 527 (1967); ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES
AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES 45 (1996); CASSESE, supra note 221, at 202–03; R. St. J. Macdonald,
Fundamental Norms in Contemporary International Law, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT’L
L. I 1987, at 115, 133 (1987); Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for
States Without or Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 223 (1993);
Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest, 250 RECUEIL DES
COURS 228 (1994). Mosler criticizes the systemic school. Hermann Mosler, Ius
Cogens im Völkerrecht, 35 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FÜR INTERNATIONALES
RECHT 9, 30–33 (1968). For proponents of the systemic school, see, inter alia,
ROBERTKOLB, THEORIE DE JUS COGENS INTERNATIONAL: ESSAI DE RELECTURE DU
CONCEPT 115–20, 171–87 (2001); Georges Abi-Saab, The Uses of Article 19, 10
EUR. J. INT’L L. 339, 349 (1999); Georges Abi-Saab, Cours general de droit
international public, 207 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 259 (1987); Georg Schwarzen-
berger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 RECUEIL DES
COURS 191, 288 (1955); JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: THE INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION
WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-COLONIAL ‘NATIONAL’ IDENTITY 101 (2000). This
article favors the substantive approach, and will henceforth be the interpre-
tation assumed, although it does not discount the utility or logic of the sys-
temic school either. It should be noted that the substantive approach has
been explicitly affirmed by the International Law Commission, which has
defined peremptory norms as “those substantive rules of conduct that prohibit
what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it presents to
the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic human values.”
Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 283 (2001) (emphasis added).
231. Sztucki, for example, has listed thirty-nine peremptory norms which
were proposed by jurists before the final drafting of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 81–84 (1974),
whilst Whiteman has a suggested list of twenty peremptory norms, Majorie
M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International law, with a Projected list, 7 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 609, 625–26 (1977).
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are peremptory such as, inter alia, the prohibition on the illegal
use of force, the prohibition on slavery, the prohibition on geno-
cide, the prohibition on apartheid, the prohibition on racial dis-
crimination, the prohibition on torture, and the right of peoples
to self-determination.232 Article 53 can therefore be reasonably
interpreted as stipulating that no derogation is permitted by
states from such norms, particularly by way of treaty. With re-
spect to the failure of Article 53 to specify whether peremptory
norms are applicable outside the treaty law context, it should
be observed that various ICJ cases233 have confirmed the opera-
232. See, e.g., ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 222, at 50–60; CASSESE, supra
note 221, at 202–03; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 101; CRAWFORD, supra note
49, at 594–96; RAIČ, supra note 43, at 141–49; GILLIAN D. TRIGGS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 459 (2006).
There is particularly stong agreement that the prohibition on the illegal use
of force is a peremptory norm. See RAIČ, supra note 43, at 144; CRAWFORD,
supra note 2, at 131; Frowein, supra note 230, ¶ 9; Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens
and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 767, 778 (1997). The International Law Commission has also enu-
merated the prohibition of the illegal use of force as “a conspicuous example”
of a peremptory norm. Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Second Part of Its Sev-
enteenth Session and on Its Eighteenth Session Including Reports of the
Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. (1966), reprint-
ed in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 1, 247–49 (1966). This view has been supported
by the International Court of Justice. Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 190
(June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6);
Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 167, ¶ 9 (separate opinion by Simma, J.); Iran v.
U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 89, ¶ 46 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.); Iran v.
U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 161, at 290, ¶ 1.1 (dissenting opinion by Elaraby, J); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 246, 254 (July 9) (separate opinion by
Elaraby, J.). Even those scholars who are skeptical, such as Sztucki and Sin-
clair, accept that the prohibition of the illegal use of force is of a peremptory
character. See SZTUCKI, supra note 231, at 120; Ian M. Sinclair, Vienna Con-
ference on the Law of Treaties, 19 INT’L&COMP. L.Q. 47, 66 (1970).
233. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v.
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 5). Here the court noted
that
[a]n essential distinction should be made between the obligations of
a State towards the international community as a whole, and those
arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection.
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view
of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligation erga om-
nes.
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tion of nonderogable rules beyond the treaty law context using
the related, although not synonymous expression,234 “erga om-
nes obligations.”235 Further, the ICJ has implicitly referred to
the operation of peremptory norms beyond the treaty law con-
text in the Case Concerning Reservations to the Genocide Con-
vention (Advisory Opinion),236 and the Nuclear Weapons Advi-
sory Opinion.237 The same court has explicitly confirmed the
The court continued that “[s]uch obligations derive, for example, in contem-
porary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of
genocide, as also from the principles and rules governing the basic rights of
the human person including protection from slavery and racial discrimina-
tion.” Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo-
slavia), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11); see East Timor (Portugal v.
Australia), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 ¶ 29 (June 30).
234. Byers, for example, defines the two terms in a similar yet distinct fash-
ion:
Jus cogens rules, otherwise known as “peremptory rules,” are non-
derogable rules of international “public policy.” They render void
other, non-peremptory rules which are in conflict with them. Erga
omnes rules, on the other hand, are rules which, if violated, give rise
to a general right of standing – amongst all States subject to those
rules – to make claims.
Michael Byers, Conceptualizing the Relationship between Jus Cogens and
Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT’L L., 211, 211–12 (1997). The same au-
thor later continues that “jus cogens rules are necessarily erga omnes rules,
but that erga omnes rules could exist which are not of a jus cogens character.”
Id. Tams has noted that “[i]t seems beyond doubt that there is, at the very
least, considerable overlap between obligations erga omnes and norms of jus
cogens.” CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 140 (2005). See generally id. at 139–46.
235. Crawford notes that the ICJ “has been wary of using the term [per-
emptory norm], employing virtual synonyms (such as the concept of obliga-
tions erga omnes).” CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 101.
236. Reservations to the Convention On the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28). Here,
the court noted that any reservation to that Convention made by a state was
illegal, declaring that the crime of genocide was “contrary to moral law and to
the spirit of the United Nations.” Further, the court concluded that “the prin-
ciples underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civi-
lized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation.”
Id.; see alsoWhiteman, supra note 231, at 609.
237. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 258 ¶ 83 (July 8). Here, after raising the concept of jus co-
gens, the court determined that “[t]here is . . . no need for the Court to pro-
nounce on this matter.” Id.
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operation of peremptory norms beyond the treaty law context
in Nicaragua v the United States of America,238 Case Concern-
ing Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. the United States
of America),239 and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opin-
ion).240 Preponderant scholarly opinion has indicated the
same.241
238. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment. 1986 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 190 (June 27).
239. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6); Iran v.
U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 167, ¶ 9 (separate opinion by Simma, J.); Iran v. U.S., 2003
I.C.J. 89, ¶ 46 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.); Iran v. U.S., 2003
I.C.J. 161, at 290, ¶ 1.1 (dissenting opinion by Elaraby, J).
240. Judge Elaraby has stated that “[t]he prohibition of the use of force, as
enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, is no doubt the most im-
portant principle that emerged in the twentieth century. It is universally rec-
ognized as a jus cogens principle, a peremptory norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted.” Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 246, 254 (July
9).
241. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 102; see also DUGARD, supra note 79, at
142; RAIČ, supra note 43, at 142–43; LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS
(JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA,
PRESENT STATUS 7 (1998); Van der Vyver, supra note 186, at 67; Milenko
Kreća, Some General Reflections on Main Features of Ius Cogens as Notion of
International Public Law, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF WOLFGANG ABENDROTH 27–40 (Rafael Gutiérrez et al. eds.,
1982); VERA GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO ILLEGAL ACTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN
RHODESIA 248 (1990); Byers, supra note 234, at 212; DE HOOGH, supra note
230, at 47; MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
ERGA OMNES 47 (2000); Macdonald, supra note 230, at 136; Bruno Simma,
From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 RECUEIL
DES COURS 217, 286, 288 (1994); Whiteman, supra note 231, at 625; Danilen-
ko, supra note 229, at 42; Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding In-
terests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 585 n.1
(1988). For the opposing and outmoded view, see, for example, Sztucki who
argues that the extension of jus cogens to unilateral acts fails to distinguish
clearly between the notions of “violation” and “derogation”:
The superiority of supposed jus cogens norms does not consist in that
they may not be lawfully violated as against others, because this is
true of all legal norms – imperative as well as dispositive; but in that
they may not be lawfully derogated from even by an agreement, and
as between the consenting parties only. Any other construction of jus
cogens would amount to the degraduation and reduction of the whole
body of law to peremptory norms as the only ones which may not be
violated.”
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It follows that peremptory norms are applicable beyond the
treaty law context, and by implication, must therefore bear up-
on territorial situations such as UNC secession.242 In broad-
stroke, this means that an entity created by UNC secession will
fail to attain statehood if it breaches peremptory norms during
its formative process.243
The foregoing should not be interpreted, however, as suggest-
ing that any breach of a peremptory norm will invalidate the
statehood of an entity created by UNC secession. It may be, for
example, that during the process of UNC secession, the erst-
while secessionist movement might violate, in an isolated
event, the peremptory norm prohibiting torture.244 However
disgraceful such an event would be, it would seem unlikely that
without further peremptory breaches statehood could be called
into question. On the other hand, where, for example, an entity
is created by UNC secession and institutes constitutionally
based racial discrimination or apartheid, statehood would not
be forthcoming.
The difference between the two situations might be described
as unsystematic and systematic peremptory breaches. In the
case of the unsystematic peremptory breach, statehood will not
be automatically invalidated, whereas the opposite conclusion
will flow from a systematic peremptory breach.245 Care must
therefore be taken to assess the nature of peremptory norm
SZTUCKI, supra note 231, at 68; see also Christos Rosenstein-Rozakis, The
Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 50–58 (1973) (unpublished JSD
thesis, University of Illinois) (on file with New York University Law School
Library).
242. Crawford notes that “norms that are non-derogable and peremptory
cannot be violated by State-creation any more than they can by treaty-
making.” CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 107. Dugard has suggested that “[a]n
act in violation of a norm having the character of jus cogens is illegal . . . this
applies to the creation of States.” DUGARD, supra note 79, at 135.
243. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 149.
244. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 102.
245. Id. at 102–05. This is reflected in Article 41 of the 2001 Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts which imposes a
duty of nonrecognition on states in the context of serious breaches of peremp-
tory norms, defined in Article 40(2) of the same Articles as “gross and sys-
tematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.” Int’l Law
Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, supra note 230, at 286,
282.
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breaches in the context of UNC secession in order to determine
whether statehood has in fact failed to crystallize.
B. Precise Effect of a Breach of Peremptory Norms During the
Process of UNC Secession
Having established the applicability of peremptory norms be-
yond the treaty law context, the following question may now be
considered: does a breach of peremptory norms during the pro-
cess of UNC secession result in statehood “without legal ef-
fect,”246 or instead prevent the attainment of statehood alto-
gether?
This question has not been thoroughly addressed by scholars.
Yet, the question is of some significance.247 If a breach of per-
emptory norms during the process of UNC secession results in
statehood without legal effect, then technically speaking, com-
pliance with peremptory norms is not a sine qua non for UNC
secession. In other words, a state created by UNC secession
may exist in violation of peremptory norms, but simply be pre-
vented from attaining legal effect and the concomitant legal
imprimatur indicated by recognition. On the other hand, if a
breach of peremptory norms during the process of UNC seces-
sion prevents the attainment of statehood altogether, there is
simply no state to be recognized. This would mean that compli-
ance with peremptory norms is a sine qua non for UNC seces-
sion. These alternative propositions are considered below.
246. DUGARD, supra note 79, at 131.
247. Raič seems inclined not to overstate the practical significance of the
two alternative viewpoints, stating,
The discussion is, it is submitted, academic, because, as was stated
above, whether the violation of a fundamental norm is a criterion
which leads to the non-existence of an entity as a State from its in-
ception, or leads to a State which is null and void ab initio, both sit-
uations lead to the existence of a situation which is ultimately legal-
ly non-existence and, in principle, without legal effect under interna-
tional law.
RAIČ, supra note 43, at 153. Whilst this is true, it is nevertheless important to
determine, in concreto, when statehood does or does not exist in a legal sense
in the context of peremptory norms.
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1. Compliance with Peremptory Norms is Not a Sine Qua Non
for UNC Secession
Scholars such as Dugard and Devine have indicated that
compliance with peremptory norms is not a sine qua non for
UNC secession. Rather, they have argued that a failure to
comply with peremptory norms only imposes a duty of non-
recognition vis-à-vis third states. Dugard, for example, has ob-
served that: “[i]nternational law distinguishes between non-
existent (inexistent) acts and acts which are null and void ab
initio by reason of their illegality. Although neither of these
acts has legal effect the distinction should be maintained if on-
ly for the purpose of jurisprudential clarity.”248 The same au-
thor continues by quoting Guggenheim:
In the case of the non-existent act “l’absence de certains élé-
ments est considérée comme si grave qu’elle n’entraîne pas la
nullité de l’acte mais son inexistence.” On the other hand, the
act which is void by reason of its illegality fulfils the require-
ments of a particular legal act but loses its validity because it
violates a rule of law in the process. Thus a treaty may fulfil
all the requirements of a valid treaty but be void, not because
it lacks an essential ingredient of a valid treaty but because it
offends against a general rule belonging to jus cogens.249
Dugard then applies the foregoing reasoning to the context of
territorial situations, suggesting that statehood is achieved by
compliance with the criteria based on effectiveness, but that
this statehood can be rendered “without legal effect”250 if the
state concerned is established in violation of peremptory
norms.251
248. DUGARD, supra note 79, at 130.
249. Id. at 130–31 (quoting Paul Guggenheim, La validite et law nullite des
actes juridiques internationaux, 74 RECUIL DES COURS 191, 204 (1949)).
250. Id. at 131.
251. Dugard has noted,
Resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly
condemn the non-recognized “States” as “null and void”, invalid and
illegal which strongly suggests that they are without legal effect as
States, not because they fail to meet the essential requirements of
statehood but because their existence violates a peremptory rule of
international law.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Several critical points can be made in relation to Dugard’s
position. First, it is conceptually problematic to hold that a
state created by UNC secession can exist in international law
upon fulfilment of the criteria for statehood based on effective-
ness, but that this can somehow be subsequently rendered
“without legal effect”252 by the violation of peremptory norms
during the state’s formative process. This is because such a line
of reasoning seems to imply the existence of two state-types:
first, those that exist in international law and have legal effect;
and second, those that exist in international law and do not
have legal effect. Conceptually this is a curious proposition253
and draws little—if any—support from state practice.
For example, during the purported UNC secession of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was generally re-
garded as violating the interconnected peremptory norms of the
right of peoples to self-determination and the prohibition on
the illegal use of force, Security Council Resolutions used the
terms “Turkish Cypriot authorities,”254 “the Turkish Cypriot
leadership,”255 and “the purported State of the Turkish Repub-
lic of Northern Cyprus.”256 The declaration by the Common-
wealth Heads of Government labelled the Turkish Republic as
an “illegal secessionist entity,”257 with Britain expressly declar-
252. Id. at 131.
253. Crawford, for example, has reflected that “[a] State is not a fact in the
sense that a chair is a fact; it is a fact in the sense in which it may be said a
treaty is a fact: that is, a legal status attaching to a certain state of affairs by
virtue of certain rules or practices.” CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 5.
254. S.C. Res. 541, at 15 (Nov. 18, 1983).
255. S.C. Res. 550, ¶ 2 (May 11, 1984).
256. Id. ¶ 3.
257. Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2224–25
(quoting Press Release, Republic of Cyprus, Commonwealth Heads of Gov’t
Meeting, New Delhi, India (November 15, 1983)). The press release remarked
that
[t]he Heads of Government condemned the declaration by the Turk-
ish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 to create a se-
cessionist state in northern Cyprus, in the area under foreign occu-
pation. Fully endorsing Security Council Resolution 541, they de-
nounced the declaration as legally invalid, and reiterated the call for
its non-recognition and immediate withdrawal. They further call up-
on all states not to facilitate or in any way assist the illegal seces-
sionist entity. They regarded this illegal act as a challenge to the in-
ternational community and demanded the implementation of the
relevant UN Resolution on Cyprus.
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ing “[w]e do not recognise the area under de facto Turkish Cyp-
riot administration as forming in any sense a separate sover-
eign state.”258 The foregoing statements do not suggest that in
modern times, states may be established in violation of per-
emptory norms “without legal effect.”259 This necessarily casts
serious doubt over Dugard’s conceptual approach, particularly
his proclivity to designate two state types.
Devine similarly indicates that compliance with peremptory
norms is not a sine qua non for UNC secession, although his
process of reasoning is substantially different. Unlike Dugard,
Devine generally denies the salience of peremptory norms, in-
stead preferring to restrict statehood to the satisfaction of the
criteria for statehood based on effectiveness. Devine argues
that additional criteria for statehood based on compliance with
peremptory norms are essentially a mechanism invented by
proponents of the declaratory recognition theory to solve recog-
nition aberrations, namely, the international community’s re-
fusal to recognize effective territorial entities.260
Devine’s conclusions, although reminiscent of constitutive
scholars such as Oppenheim,261 Kelsen,262 and Schwarzen-
berger,263 do not draw support from modern treaty law, state
practice, or the majority of scholars. Furthermore, his position
entirely discounts the evolution of peremptory norms in con-
temporary international law. As demonstrated above,264 the
validity of peremptory norms has been affirmed in numerous
cases before the ICJ.265 Furthermore, since the promulgation of
Id. See also RAIČ, supra note 43, at 156 n.298.
258. Eur. Parl. Deb. (June 24, 1992) (remarks of Mr. Garel-Jones), cited in
Geoffrey Marston, United Kingdom Materials on International Law, 63
BRITISHY.B. INT’L L. 647 (1992). See also RAIČ, supra note 43, at 156 n.298.
259. DUGARD, supra note 79, at 131.
260. Derry J. Devine, The Requirements of Statehood Re-Examined, 34
MODERN L. REV. 410, 416 (1971). For virtually identical comments, see Derry
J. Devine, Rhodesia since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1 ACTA
JURIDICA 1, 86 (1973).
261. LASSA F. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 125–26 (Hersch Lauter-
pacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
262. Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observa-
tions, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 605, 608 (1941).
263. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (3d ed. 1957).
264. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
265. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v.
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 5); Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Pre-
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the preponder-
ance of scholarly opinion has also supported the de lege lata
status of peremptory norms.266 To conclude, therefore, as
Devine does, that such norms are a mere mechanism to over-
come alleged deficiencies inherent in the declaratory recogni-
tion theory is highly questionable. A priori, to conclude that
states created by UNC secession may violate peremptory norms
is also highly questionable.
2. Compliance with Peremptory Norms is a Sine Qua Non for
UNC Secession
The view that compliance with peremptory norms—in con-
temporary times—is a sine qua non for UNC secession draws
support from state practice. Due to space limitations, five rela-
tively contemporary case studies will be selected: the TRNC,
Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. None of
these “entities” have been regarded as states by the interna-
tional community. It is presently argued that this is because
each breached one or more peremptory norms during their
liminary Objections (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Judgment, 1996
I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11); East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995
I.C.J. 90, 102 ¶ 29 (June 30); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 91, ¶ 190 (June
27); Reservations to the Convention On the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28); Legali-
ty of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 258 ¶ 83 (July 8); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161
(Nov. 6); Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 167, ¶ 9 (separate opinion by Simma, J.);
Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 89, ¶ 46 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.);
Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 161, 290, ¶ 1.1 (Elaraby, J., dissenting); Legal Con-
sequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ry, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 246, 254 (July 9) (separate opinion by
Elaraby, J.).
266. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 101; Hannikainen, supra note
241, at 317; ORAKHELASHVILI, supra, note 222, at 50–66; Jiménez de Aré-
chaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 64–65 (1978); Scheuner, supra note 230, at 527; L. A. Alexidze, Legal
Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, 172 RECUEIL DES
COURS 220, 262–63 (1981); Takeshi Minagawa, Jus Cogens in Public Interna-
tional Law, 6 HITOTSUBASHI J.L. & POL. 16, 24 (1968); Vladimir Paul, The
Legal Consequences of Conflict Between a Treaty and an Imperative Norm of
General International Law (Jus Cogens), 21 ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 19, 35–36 (1971); HERMANN MOSLER, THE
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY 139 (1980).
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formative process. The most common peremptory norms to be
breached during the process of UNC secession are the right of
peoples to self-determination and the prohibition on the illegal
use of force. Both of these peremptory norms are systematic in
character and therefore decisively bear upon the attainment of
statehood.
a. The TRNC—Attempted UNC Secession
In 1878, after more than three hundred years of Ottoman
rule, Turkey agreed to assign control of Cyprus (but not sover-
eignty) to Britain, in exchange for Britain’s decision to join
Turkey in a defensive alliance against Russia. When Turkey
joined with Germany in World War I, however, Britain an-
nexed the island and it henceforth became a British colony. On
July 24, 1923, pursuant to the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey offi-
cially recognized the British annexation.267
During Britain’s rule, tensions between the island’s two main
ethnic groups—Greeks and Turks—were high. In 1950 a plebi-
scite was conducted by the Greek Orthodox Church throughout
Cyprus in which 95.7 percent of the Greek Cypriot population
voted for unification with Greece. This led to Greek Cypriots
submitting a proposal to the British for enosis (unification with
Greece). Not surprisingly, London rejected the proposal, and
Greece then sought to bring the matter before the U.N., only to
have the General Assembly refrain from comment.268 In re-
sponse to these rebuffs, in 1955 the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion
Agoniston, or the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
(“EOKA”), was formed with the aim of militarily achieving eno-
sis with Greece. This objective entailed attacks against British
targets and Turkish Cypriot interests. In counter-response, in
1958 the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilâti, or Turkish Resistance Or-
ganization (“TMT”), was formed, which initiated attacks on
267. ZIAM M. NECATIGIL, THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND THE TURKISH POSITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–4 (1989); David Wippman, International Law and
Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 141, 144 (1996); S. Kwaw Nya-
meke Blay, Self-Determination in Cyprus: The New Dimensions of an Old
Conflict, 10 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 67, 68–69 (1987); Marios L. Evriviades, The
Legal Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict, 10 TEX. INT’L L.J. 227, 228–29 (1975).
268. See generally Stephen G. Xydis, The UN General Assembly as an In-
strument of Greek Policy: Cyprus, 1954-1958, 12 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 141, 141–
58 (1968).
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Greek Cypriot property and campaigned for taksim (partition
of Cyprus).269
Against this backdrop of deteriorating ethnic relations, on
February 11, 1959, Greece, Turkey, and Britain reached an
agreement on Cyprus’ future, which entailed independent
statehood. The agreement was promptly accepted by the Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and paved the way
for the island’s independence. Pursuant to the agreement, the
Constitution of Cyprus was signed on April 6, 1960 and on the
same day Cyprus became an independent state.
Throughout the early 1960s, relations between the Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities steadily deteriorat-
ed, with a series of violent confrontations between the two
groups. Fighting reputedly took place throughout various loca-
tions on the island during 1964.270 The result was that Greek
Cypriots gained control of almost all the island, whilst the
Turkish Cypriot population formed enclaves and avoided inter-
action with the Greeks. As tensions increased, the Greek gov-
ernment, still committed to enosis, militarily aided the Greek
Cypriot community, whilst the Turkish Government militarily
aided the Turkish Cypriot community. Although Britain—with
the assistance of the United States—attempted to mediate the
ethnic tensions, it was ultimately unsuccessful, with both
communities increasingly preferring separation to integra-
tion.271
Against a backdrop of ongoing ethnic tensions and unsuccess-
ful negotiations, on November 15, 1983, the Turkish north,
with the direct support of the Turkish military, declared its
sovereign independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern
269. NECATIGIL, supra note 267, at 5–7; DAVID CARMENT ET. AL, WHO
INTERVENES? ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERSTATE CRISIS 182 (2006); Thomas
Ehrlich, Cyprus, The “Warlike Isle”: Origins and Elements of the Current Cri-
sis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1030 (1966).
270. One event in particular seems to have galvanized the Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot communities against each other, namely, the searching
of a Turkish car by a Greek police patrol, which resulted in several Turks
allegedly being killed and one police officer seriously injured. Soon thereafter,
intercommunal fighting broke out. See NECATIGIL, supra note 267, at 29;
CHARLES FOLEY, LEGACY OF STRIFE: CYPRUS FROM REBELLION TO CIVIL WAR
168 (1964); Ehrlich, supra note 269, at 1044; Wippman, supra note 267, at
146.
271. CARMENT ET. AL, supra note 269, at 187.
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Cyprus.272 Almost immediately, the declaration was condemned
by the world community, with only one state—Turkey—
providing immediate recognition. Paralleling this, the TRNC
was characterized as a non-state entity by various internation-
al fora.273 This was despite the fact that the TRNC satisfied the
criteria for statehood based on effectiveness.
When considering the TRNC’s attempted UNC secession from
Cyprus, two key factors must be borne in mind. First, the
TRNC was not established pursuant to the customary law right
to external self-determination.274 This is because although
there was evidence of human rights abuses against Turkish
Cypriots by Greek Cypriots (and vice versa) in northern Cy-
prus, there was a complete absence of human rights abuses in
extremis, such as ethnic cleansing, mass killings, or genocide.
Second, the establishment of the TRNC from the Republic of
Cyprus was primarily facilitated by the direct intervention of
Turkish troops. Without this intervention the TRNC could not
have existed.275 This intervention, however, was not made un-
der the auspices of a valid right to external self-determination
as was the case, for example, with India’s direct intervention in
272. Adamantia Pollis, Cyprus: Nationalism vs. Human Rights, 1
UNIVERSAL HUM. RTS. 89, 95 (1979); Suzanne Palmer, The Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus: Should the United States Recognize it as an Independent
State?, 4 B.U. INT’L L.J. 423, 442 (1986).
273. S.C. Res. 541, supra note 254, pmbl. (describing the TRNC as “Turkish
Cypriot authorities”); S.C. Res. 550, supra note 255, ¶¶ 2–3 (referring to the
TRNC as “the Turkish Cypriot leadership,” and “the purported State of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”); Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment, 1996-
VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2224–25 (quoting Press Release, Republic of Cyprus,
Commonwealth Heads of Gov’t Meeting, New Delhi, India (November 15,
1983) (calling the TRNC an “illegal secessionist entity”)). See also RAIČ, supra
note 43, at 156 n.298.
274. See discussion supra Part II.
275. Raič, for example, has noted that
it is difficult to believe that the TRNC could have been established
unilaterally, that is, without outside intervention by Turkey. In-
stead, the establishment of the TNRC is a direct result of the Turk-
ish occupation of the northern part of the island. Through the con-
tinued presence of 30,000 Turkish troops there, Turkey in fact se-
cures and supports the de facto partition of Cyprus.
RAIČ, supra note 43, at 126; see also VIVA ONA BARTKUS, THE DYNAMIC OF
SECESSION 162 (1999); David Souter, The Cyprus Conundrum: The Challenge
of the Intercommunal Talks, 11 THIRDWORLDQ. 76, 78 (1989).
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Bangladesh. A further factor arguably solidifying the TRNC’s
breach of the peremptory norm prohibiting the illegal use of
force is that Turkey, since 1983, has permanently occupied the
territory. Unlike India’s direct intervention in Bangladesh, no
obvious humanitarian disaster prompted Turkey’s direct inter-
vention, and furthermore, Turkish forces permanently re-
mained within northern Cyprus after this direct interven-
tion.276
The breaches of the interconnected peremptory norms of the
right of peoples to self-determination and the prohibition on
the illegal use of force thus worked to deny the TRNC state-
hood.277 This view is sustained by the fact that Turkey is the
only state that recognizes the TRNC.278
b. Chechnya—Attempted UNC Secession
The territory known as present day Chechnya was conquered
by imperial Russia in 1864, after a long and bloody struggle
lasting over one hundred years. Although militarily defeated,
Chechens never accepted Russian rule, continuing to harbor
independence ambitions throughout the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.279 These ambitions were mobilized
after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, when Chechnya and the
276. Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secssion and the Use of Force:
Effect on Claims to Statehood in International Law, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 197,
235–37 (2013).
277. See Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2224–
25; RAIČ, supra note 43, at 125. For a discussion of various General Assembly
and Security Council resolutions condemning the TRNC and denying its at-
tainment of statehood, see van der Vyver, supra note 186, at 42–44 (discuss-
ing various General Assembly and Security Council resolutions condemning
the TRNC and denying its attainment of statehood). See generally DUGARD,
supra note 79, at 108–11; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 143–47.
278. van der Vyver, supra note 186, at 43; see also text accompanying note
277.
279. Christopher Panico, Conflict in the Caucasus: Russia’s War in Chech-
nya, in BEYOND THE SOVIET UNION: THE FRAGMENTATION OF POWER 256–57
(Max Beloff ed., 1997); Wendy Turnoff Atrokhov, The Khasavyurt Accords:
Maintaining the Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Democracy in the Russian
Federation Amidst the Chechen Crisis, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 367, 369–70
(1999). Enmity between Russians and Chechens has deep historical roots. In
1818, for instance, General Ermolov, governor of the Caucasus, when refer-
ring to security problems in the region informed Tsar Alexander I that he
“could find no peace until not a single Chechen remained alive.” Marie Ben-
nigsen Broxup, The Chechens, 26 FREEDOM REV. 5, 6 (1995).
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other Russian mini-mountain-states of Kabardinoo-Balkaria,
Karatchay-Cherkess, Ingushetia, and Ossetia attempted to se-
cede and form a federation in the Caucasus region.280 After ex-
tensive fighting, the region was reconquered by the Soviet state
in 1921, after which thousands of Chechens were forcibly de-
ported to concentration camps.281 Forced relocations and mass
detention continued intermittently for the next two decades,
culminating in Joseph Stalin’s brutal crackdown during World
War II, justified on the groundless charge of Nazi-Chechen co-
operation.282 Needless to say, these activities only further em-
bittered Russian-Chechen relations.
In 1991, amid the chaos and confusion of the Soviet Union’s
dissolution, Chechens again sensed an opportunity to regain
their independence. In August of that year Dzhokar Dudaev, a
retired Soviet Air Force General, led a coup d’état against the
communist government in Grozny.283 In presidential elections
280. Trent N. Tappe, Chechnya and the State of Self-Determination in a
Breakaway Region of the Former Soviet Union: Evaluating the Legitimacy of
Secessionist Claims, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 255, 274, 274 n.88 (1995);
Atrokhov, supra note 279, at 370–71.
281. Before being reconquered, the Caucasus Federation was recognized by
many governments, including Turkey, Germany, Austro-Hungary and Brit-
ain. See Broxup, supra note 279, at 6.
282. Tappe claims that in 1995 it was “impossible to find any person over 50
who did not grow up in a concentration camp.” See Tappe, supra note 280, at
274–75. Bowker claims that “almost 500,000 Chechens and Ingush were
herded into cattle trucks and deported to Central Asia for their alleged sup-
port of the Nazis.” Mike Bowker, Russia and Chechnya: The Issue of Seces-
sion, 10 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 461, 466 (2004). For an almost identical ac-
count, see ANATOL LIEVEN, CHECHNYA: THE TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER
319 (1998). Avtorkhanov has written that “Stalin faithfully executed the or-
ders of Nicholas I to exterminate the Mountaineers, albeit after a delay of
more than a century.” Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Chechens and Ingush
During the Soviet Period and Its Antecedents, in THE NORTH CAUCUSUS
BARRIER 184 (Marie Bennigsen Broxup ed., 1992); see also JOHN B. DUNLOP,
RUSSIA CONFRONTS CHECHNYA: ROOTS OF A SEPARATIST CONFLICT 40–84 (1998);
Broxup, supra note 279, at 7; VALERY TISHKOV, CHECHNYA: LIFE IN A WAR-
TORN SOCIETY 16–32 (2004) (detailing disturbing first-hand historical ac-
counts of Soviet deportations); Panico, supra note 279, at 257–58; Luke P.
Bellocchi, Recent Developments: Self-Determination in the Case of Chechnya,
2 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 183, 188–89 (1995); Enders S. Wimbush, Russia’s Strategic
Failure, 26 FREEDOM REV. 8, 8–9 (1995); Gail W. Lapidus, Contested Sover-
eignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya, 23 INT’L SECURITY 5, 8–9 (1998).
283. Dudaev was a pragmatic and incongruous politician. He openly es-
poused anti-Russian rhetoric, yet his whole career was devoted to the Rus-
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held in October (which were quite possibly fraudulent), Dudaev
secured the Chechen Presidency, and shortly thereafter, on
November 1, unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the
Chechen Republic.284
Chechnya’s attempted UNC secession from Russia was punc-
tuated by two major outbreaks of hostilities. The first of these
occurred in December 1994 when the Russian government de-
cided to launch a full-scale invasion to retake Chechen-held
territory. As the war dragged on, Russian forces began to apply
ever increasing force, frustrated by the Chechen’s guerrilla tac-
tics and their increasing use of civilian targets as shields. The
price of military victory, however, was high: upwards of twenty
to thirty thousand innocent civilians were killed during the
fighting.285
sian military and he was married to a Russian. He claimed to be the savior of
the Chechen people, but had reputedly not been to Chechnya before arriving
to overthrow the government of Duko Zavgaev (formally living in Estonia).
He also espoused support for Islam as a unifying force within Chechnya, but
did not even know how many times a day a Muslim should pray. See VANORA
BENNET, CRYING WOLF: THE RETURN OF A WAR TO CHECHNYA 244 ( 2001);
Bowker, supra note 282, at 466–67. Tishlov paints an assessment of Dudaev
as deeply suspicious and paranoid:
In 1993, when an explosion twenty kilometres from Grozny killed
the Chechen interior minister and his driver, Dudayev claimed that
it was an attempt on his own life. He attacked the local prefect and
ordered the State Security Department to arrest him. The prefect’s
relatives defended him at gunpoint, and the order was not carried
out. But the next day, the Security Department abducted R. B.
Ezerkhanov, head of the administration of Alhhan-Kala (a village six
kilometres from the site of the assassination), whom Dudayev sus-
pected of complicity because he had been seen to glance at his watch
fifteen minutes before the explosion. A warrant was issued for the
arrest of Ch. R. Vakhidov, an Interior Ministry department head, on
suspicion of his involvement because he had gone on holiday a week
earlier.
TISHKOV, supra note 282, at 78–79.
284. Id.; see also RAIČ, supra note 43, at 373; Dunlop, supra note 282, at
113–15; Tappe, supra note 280, at 275; Bellocchi, supra note 282, at 186–87;
Panico, supra note 279, at 258–59, 261; Jonathan I. Charney, Self-
Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
455, 462 (2001); Ib Faurby, International Law, Human Rights and the War in
Chechnya, 2002 BALTICDEFENCE REV., no. 1, at 103.
285. Panico, supra note 279, at 270–71; Charney, supra note 284, at 463;
RAIČ, supra note 43, at 374 n.233.
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In the years that followed, negotiations continued between
the Russian and Chechen governments, with Moscow again of-
fering Grozny substantial autonomy. In the end, however, the
negotiations were unsuccessful, with the Chechen government
unwilling to abandon its core goal of independence.286
Relations further deteriorated between the two sides in 1996,
when Russians resident in Chechnya were forced to flee the
territory as the result of discrimination and assaults. It was
widely reported that throughout this time Chechnya failed to
evidence stable and effective government and “respect for the
rule of law.”287 Chechen terrorist attacks in Moscow in late Au-
gust and early September 1999 destroyed relations entirely.288
The second Russian-Chechen war began in October 1999, and
ended in February 2000, when large parts of Chechnya, includ-
ing Grozny, were conquered by Russian forces. The quick victo-
ry was facilitated by the use of overwhelming military force,
which not only destroyed the Republic’s vital infrastructure,
but also killed many innocent civilians. The ferocity of the Rus-
sian onslaught was condemned by many sections of the inter-
national community, appalled by the killing of innocent civil-
ians and the use of disproportionate force.289 With the excep-
tion of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime,290 no country recognized
Chechnya’s right to independence, with many states—mindful
of not offending Moscow—preferring to characterize the conflict
as an “internal matter” and emphasizing Russia’s right to de-
fend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.291
286. Id. at 375.
287. Lord Judd, Rapporteur, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly,
The Conflict in Chechnya, Parl. Ass. Doc. 8630, ¶ 29 (Jan. 2000) (indicating a
lack of effective and stable government); see also RAIČ, supra note 43, at 375.
288. JAMES M. GOLDGEIER & MICHAEL MCFAUL, POWER AND PURPOSE: US
POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA AFTER THE COLD WAR 267–68 (2003); see also RAIČ,
supra note 43, at 375.
289. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/58, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Res/2000/58.25 (Apr. 2000); see also RAIČ, supra note 43, at 375 n.241.
See generally GOLDGEIER & MCFAUL, supra note 288, at 268–69; Bowker, su-
pra note 282, at 471; Faurby, supra note 284, at 105–10.
290. Thomas D. Grant, Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes
Chechnya, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 869, 869–882 (2000).
291. U.S. President Bill Clinton, for instance, in a speech made at Istanbul
on November 19, 1999, stated, “about the situation in Chechnya . . . . [w]e
want to see Russia a stable, prosperous, strong democracy, with secure bor-
ders, strong defences and a leading voice in world affairs.” RAIČ, supra note
43, at 378 n.249. America’s Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, testi-
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It is clear then that Chechnya was not regarded by the inter-
national community as a state. This can be explained by the
fact that Chechnya’s UNC secession was not in accordance with
the customary law right to external self-determination.292 At
the time of Chechnya’s declaration of independence in 1991,
Chechens were not denied the right to internal self-
determination within the Soviet Union. In immediately previ-
ous decades Chechens had been free to participate in govern-
ment, civil administration, and the Soviet armed forces. Alt-
hough systematic human rights abuses had occurred under Jo-
seph Stalin, since Nikita Kruschev’s Premiership, no wide-
spread human rights violations were perpetrated against the
Chechen people. In fact if anything, steps seem to have been
taken by Moscow to ameliorate past injustices.293 Therefore,
Chechnya’s UNC secession was not declared out of an immi-
nent need for survival, or as an escape from sustained and sys-
tematic human rights abuses in extremis. A priori, it did not
conform with the peremptory norm of the right of peoples to
self-determination. Moreover, the Chechen government con-
sistently refused Russia’s offers of negotiation and autonomy,
thereby indicating that UNC secession was not an ultimum
remedium. This ensured that Chechnya’s statehood did not
crystallize.
fied to the House International Relations Committee, on October 19, 1999
that
Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia – these are all republics of the ter-
ritory of the Russian Federation. We recognize Russia’s international
boundaries and its obligation to protect all of its citizens against
separatism and attacks on lawful authorities. We also acknowledge
the current outbreak of violence began when insurgents, based in
Chechnya, launched an offensive in Dagestan. Russia also has been
rocked by lethal bombings of apartment buildings deep in the Rus-
sian heartland, including Moscow itself.
GOLDGEIER & MCFAUL, supra note 288, at 272. See generally
GNANAPALAWELHENGAMA, MINORITIES’ CLAIMS: FROM AUTONOMY TO
SECESSION, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE PRACTICE 301 (2001); Svante E.
Cornell, International Reactions to Massive Human Rights Violations: The
Case of Chechnya, 51 EUROPE-ASIA STUD. 85, 91 (1999); Richard Sakwa,
Chechnya: A Just War Fought Unjustly?, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION:
NORMATIVE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 157 (Bruno Coppieters &
Richard Sakwa eds., 2003).
292. See discussion supra Part II.
293. Atrokhov, supra note 279, at 372; RAIČ, supra note 43, at 373.
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c. Abkhazia—Attempted UNC Secession
The outbreak of hostilities between Abkhazia and Georgia
can only be understood against the backdrop of “Georgianiza-
tion” which took place during the 1930s, 1940s, and early
1950s. During this time, the Abkhazian language was banned
and the Abkhazian alphabet was changed to a Georgian base.
Coupled with this, large numbers of Georgians and Russians
were settled into Abkhazia, ensuring that Abkhazians were a
numerical minority in their traditional homeland. After Sta-
lin’s death, this policy was reversed and Abkhazians were over
represented in the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia.294 However,
subsequent calls by Abkhazia to break away from Georgia and
become a separate republic within the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics were flatly rejected by Moscow.
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, tensions
between Georgians and Abkhazians reintensified. In December
of that year, a new parliament was elected in Abkhazia, which
quickly became divided along ethnic lines: Georgian deputies
repeatedly rejected the decisions of the majority, comprised
principally of Abkhazian deputies.295
A period of uncertainty commenced whereby Georgia sought
a restoration of political conditions from 1918, which required
that Abkhazia’s autonomous status would be revoked. On the
other side, Abkhazia proposed a draft treaty to the Georgian
State Council which would have provided for federative rela-
tions between Georgia and Abkhazia. The Abkhazian proposal
was ignored, thereby causing the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet to
declare Abkhazian sovereignty and to reinstate the Constitu-
tion of 1925, which enshrined Abkhazia’s republican status but
with treaty ties to Georgia. This in turn prompted Georgia, in
August 1992, to dispatch the National Guard to Abkhazia to
suppress the growing Abkhazian independence movement. Mil-
itary skirmishes ensued, with Georgian troops eventually ex-
pelled from Abkhazia by late September 1993.296
A ceasefire was brokered on December 1, 1993. Negotiations
continued intermittently until 1995, when Russia proposed a
federative arrangement, which was accepted by Georgia, only
to be rejected by Abkhazia. The Security Council in 1996 voiced
294. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 379–80.
295. Id. at 380.
296. Id. at 381.
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its “commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Georgia.”297 Relations were further soured in 1997, when ap-
proximately thirty thousand returning Georgian refugees were
expelled by Abkhazian authorities, a move which was con-
demned internationally as an act of “ethnic cleansing.”
On October 12, 1999, Abkhazia declared its independence
from Georgia. However at the time of writing, only Russia,
Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Naru, have extended recognition.
This lack of recognition stems from the fact that Abkhazia’s
UNC secession did not conform with the customary law right of
peoples to external self-determination.298 In the period prior to
the declaration of independence, Abkhazian citizens were not
subject to deliberate, sustained, and systematic human rights
abuses in extremis at the hands of Georgia.299 As such, Abkha-
zia’s UNC secession violated the peremptory norm of the right
of peoples to self-determination, which in turn ensured that
Abkhazia’s statehood failed to crystallize.300
d. South Ossetia—Attempted UNC Secession
South Ossetia’s attempted UNC secession finds its roots in
the early days of the Russian Revolution. When Georgia de-
clared its independence in 1918, a civil war erupted between
the Bolshevik South Ossetians and the Menshevik Georgians.
The consequences of this civil war were catastrophic for the
South Ossetians who were said to experience genocide. When
the Red Army recaptured Georgia, South Ossetia was declared
to be part of the Georgian Soviet Republic. South Ossetia did,
however, enjoy the status of an “autonomous region.”301 Unsur-
prisingly, perhaps, latent ethnic tensions remained between
Georgians and South Ossetians.
297. S.C. Res. 1065 (July 12, 1996).
298. See discussion supra Part II.
299. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 385; Levan Alexidze, Kosovo and South Ossetia:
Similar or Different? Consequences for International Law, BALTIC Y.B. INT’L
L. 75, 83–85 (2012).
300. Nuβberger, supra note 7, at 363 (“[Abkhazia’s statehood] does not have
any basis in international law.”).
301. Id. at 351; Noelle Higgins & Kiernan O’Reilly, The Use of Force, Wars
of National Liberation and the Right to Self-Determination in the South Osse-
tian Conflict, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 567, 569 (2009).
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, these tensions
reemerged.302 In the wake of civil war with Georgia, on Decem-
ber 21, 1991, South Ossetia declared its independence. This
declaration was later complimented by a referendum on Janu-
ary 19, 1992, which indicated support for South Ossetia’s inde-
pendence and reunification with Russia.303
In the period between 1992 and 2007, the conflict between
Georgia and South Ossetia remained unresolved. Persons dis-
placed by the civil war were unable to return to their homes,
and Georgia refused to acknowledge South Ossetia’s declara-
tion of independence. Small-scale military skirmishes occasion-
ally occurred between the two sides, but no concerted military
engagements took place.
On April 26, 2007, the South Ossetian parliament adopted a
“Declaration on the genocide of the South Ossetians in the pe-
riod between 1989 and 1992.” This declaration emphasized that
events between 1989 and 1993 were a reaction to Georgian “na-
tional chauvinism and separatism” resulting from Georgian
“aggression based on an imperialist and fascist ideology.”304
Moreover, the declaration characterized Georgia’s actions dur-
ing this period as “genocide.” Whilst nationalist sentiments
were certainly stoked by the Georgian President Gamzachur-
dia, who had discussed initiatives such as ethnic minorities be-
ing denied Georgian citizenship, it was unlikely that South Os-
setians, during 1989—1991, were the victims of genocide.305
Indeed, post-1991, particularly once Gamzachurdia was de-
posed in a coup d’état, and replaced by the more conciliatory
and moderate President Shewardnadze, it appeared as though
a political solution might be brokered.306 This more conciliatory
stance was evidenced by the adoption on June 24, 1992, of a
ceasefire agreement between Georgia and South Ossetia, over-
seen by Russia. A joint peacekeeping operation, comprising Os-
302. MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 (2013); Christian Axobe Nielsen, The Kosovo Prece-
dent and the Rhetorical Deployment of former Yugoslav Analogies in the Cas-
es of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 9 SOUTHEAST EUR. & BLACK SEA STUD. 171,
175 (2009). See also Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, Zone of Conflict: Clash of Para-
digms in South Ossetia, 2 USAK Y.B. INT’L POL. & L. 251, 255 (2009).
303. See Angelika Nußberger, South Ossetia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 11 (2013).
304. Nußberger, supra note 7, at 357.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 358.
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setians, Russians, and Georgians was implemented, ensuring a
cessation of hostilities and the possibility of political compro-
mise.
Following the Rose Revolution of November 2003,307
Shewardnadze was forced to resign as Georgian President and
was replaced by Mikheil Saakashvili, who had vowed to regain
control over disputed Georgian territory. This represented a
shift to a more divisive approach to Georgian and South Osse-
tian relations, typified by reports of Georgian television run-
ning advertisements for army recruits supported by the Nazi
inspired slogan that lost territory could only be regained
“through the force of weapons.”308
Events took a more decisive turn after the “five day war” be-
tween Russia and Georgia during August 2008.309 Although it
is difficult to determine precisely how the war started, it is
clear that Georgia initiated a military operation against South
Ossetia of significant size, and that this was repelled by the
intervention of Russian troops. Thousands were killed on either
side, and the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, recognized
South Ossetia’s independence, stating that “[it was] not an easy
choice to make, but it represents the only possibility to save
human lives.”310
Whilst it is obvious that Georgians and South Ossetians ex-
perienced a prolonged breakdown of relations and intermittent
hostilities during the period 1989-2008, it must be asked
whether South Ossetia’s UNC secession conformed with the
customary law right of peoples to external self-
determination.311 More pointedly, it must be asked whether
South Ossetians experienced sustained and systematic human
307. See generally Stephen F. Jones, The Rose Revolution: A Revolution
Without Revolutionaries?, 19 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’LAFF. 33 (2006).
308. Road to War in Georgia: The Chronicle of a Caucasian Tragedy, DER
SPEIGEL (Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/road-to-
war-in-georgia-the-chronicle-of-a-caucasian-tragedy-a-574812.html.
309. See T. L. Thomas, The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Ap-
praises its Five-Day War in South Ossetia, 22 J. SLAVIC MIL. STUD. 31, 38–39
(2009); Higgins & O’Reilly, supra note 301, at 571–73. See generally Charles
King, The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis, FOREIGN
AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 2; Michael Toomey, August 2008 Battle of South Os-
setia: Does Russia Have a Legal Argument for Intervention?, 23 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 443 (2009).
310. Nußberger, supra note 7, at 359.
311. See discussion supra Part II.
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rights abuses in extremis at the hands of Georgians, with no
prospect for peaceful resolution of the conflict. It would seem
most likely that the answer is no, as prospects for a political
solution stopping short of UNC secession were possible, partic-
ularly under Shewardnadze’s more moderate influence.312 This
determination is reflected by the international community of
states, as at the time of writing, only Russia, Nicaragua, Vene-
zuela, and Naru have extended recognition. It would seem then
that South Ossetia’s statehood has failed to crystallize, owing
principally to the fact that its UNC secession was not in con-
formity with the peremptory norm of the right of peoples to
self-determination.
A separate yet related matter is whether Russia’s direct mili-
tary intervention in the five day war, which resulted in mili-
tary strikes by Russia against Georgian military infrastructure
and precipitated South Ossetia’s UNC secession, was a breach
of the peremptory norm prohibiting the illegal use of force. The
answer would seem to be in the affirmative, a fact bolstered by
the continuing Russian military presence in the region. Paral-
lels can therefore be drawn between Russia’s involvement in
South Ossetia and Turkey’s military intervention, and ongoing
military presence, in the TRNC.
e. Transnistria—Attempted UNC Secession
Transnistria’s attempted UNC secession finds its roots in
Moldolva’s complex history. Following the Russo-Turkish war
of 1806-1812, the area between Prut and the Dniester rivers
was annexed by Russia, taking the name Bessarabia.313 This
region enjoyed autonomy within the Russian Empire and was
initially composed mostly of ethnic, Romanian-speaking Mol-
dovans. Over time, however, Russia began to exert increasing
influence throughout Bessarabia, replacing the Romanian lan-
guage with Russian, and removing local political control. Cou-
pled with this, large numbers of other ethnic groups entered
Bessarabia, especially Russians. These actions ensured that
the percentage of Moldovans resident in Bessarabia fell from
312. Nußberger, supra note 7, at 359–60; Alexidze, supra note 299, at 85–
87.
313. W. Alejandro Sanchez, The “Frozen” Southeast: How the Moldova-
Transnistria Question has Become a European Geo-Security Issue, 22 J.
SLAVICMIL. STUD. 153, 155 (2009).
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86 percent in the beginning of the nineteenth century, to 48
percent by the beginning of the twentieth century.314
In response to these demographic changes, pan-Romanian
nationalists began to espouse desires for integration with Ro-
mania. In the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1917, a na-
tional assembly was created—the Sfatul Tarii—which voted in
favor of establishing the Moldovan Democratic Republic of Bes-
sarabia. Importantly, the borders of this newly declared repub-
lic did not include the stretch of land now known as Transnis-
tria. On March 28, 1918, the Sfatul Tarii voted in favor of uni-
fication with Romania, and by the end of 1918, the areas of Bu-
kovina and Transylvania had also joined, thereby creating
“Greater Romania.”315
In 1944, the Red Army captured Bessarabia. Shortly thereaf-
ter, Bessarabia was added to the territory which had formed
the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the
Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova was formed. This move
ensured that Moldova inherited a large ethnic Russian com-
munity, which tended to be disproportionately represented in
professional positions, whilst Moldovans remained mostly in
agricultural roles.316 During this period of postwar assimila-
tion, a concerted attempt was made to propagate a distinct
Moldovan national identity, a project which was for the most
part successful, as indicated by the fact that modern Moldo-
vans do not consider themselves ethnically Romanian.317
With the loosening of Moscow’s political grip under the poli-
cies of Perestroika and glasnost, calls for greater linguistic and
cultural freedom were made throughout Moldova. Chief among
such voices were the Popular Front, an opposition group which
challenged policies of “Russification” and unreformed com-
munism. In August 1989, the Moldovan parliament, the Su-
preme Soviet, made Moldovan the state language, instituting
the Latin rather than Cyrillic alphabet. Culturally, moves were
made in the direction of pan-Romanianism, which triggered an
adverse response from Slavic elites, particularly those in
Transnistria. In effect, political power began to shift away from
314. Michael F. Hamm, Kishinev: The Character and Development of a Tsa-
trist Frontier Town, 26 NATIONALITY PAPERS 19, 19, 25 (1998).
315. Steven D. Roper, Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria
and Gagauzia, 11 REGIONAL&FED. STUD. 101, 102 (2001).
316. Id. at 103.
317. Id.
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ethnic Russians to Romanian speakers. This culminated in the
election of a Moldovan Parliament dominated by the Popular
Front and ethnic Moldovans. Perhaps more worrying for Slavic
elites, the newly elected Prime Minister, Mircea Druc, was an
avid pan-Romanian.
Transnistria responded to these developments by declaring
its independence from Moldova on September 2, 1990.318 The
Moldovan government viewed Transnistria’s independence dec-
laration as illegitimate, akin to treachery or terrorism.
Throughout late 1991 and 1992, military clashes occurred be-
tween Moldovan and Transnistrian paramilitary groups along
the Dniester River, resulting in over one-hundred deaths. Dur-
ing this time, Transnistrian forces were fortified by a transfer
of soldiers and arms from the Russian 14th Army. Indeed, by
December 1991, the 14th Army’s commander, General Genna-
dii Yakovlev, took up the position of Transnistrian Defence
Minister.319 In effect, Transnistria’s calls for independence be-
came a focal point for Russian desires to “protect and defend”
the “old ways” throughout the now defunct Soviet Union. This
desire was personified when the Russian Vice President, Alex-
ander Rutskoi, visited Transnistria as a show of solidarity.
The decisive turning point in the violence seems to have been
Transnistria’s capture of the strategically important town of
Bender on June 20—21, 1992. After this date, Moldovan au-
thorities realized that so long as Transnistria enjoyed the sup-
port of the Russian 14th Army, there was no prospect of a mili-
tarily resolution. A ceasefire agreement was signed on July 21,
1992, and Transnistria has remained beyond Moldovan control
until the present day. Although various attempts at political
resolution have been made, they have, thus far, been unsuc-
cessful. In March 2014, in the wake of Crimea’s accession to
Russia, the Transnistrian Parliament also pressed for acces-
sion, but the situation remains unresolved.320
318. Trans-Dniester Profile, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18284837; Andreas Johansson, The
Transnistrian Conflict After the 2005 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections, 22
J. COMMUNIST STUD. & TRANSITION POL. 507 (2006).
319. Roper, supra note 315, at 107; Christopher J. Borgen, Imagining Sov-
ereignty, Managing Secession: The Legal Geography of Eurasia’s “Frozen Con-
flicts,” 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 477, 498–99 (2007).
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2015] Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession 87
Transnistria has enjoyed both a stable and effective govern-
ment throughout its period of political estrangement from Mol-
dova. Yet, Transnistria has not received recognition from any
U.N. member state. This strongly indicates that Transnistria
has failed to achieve statehood. The principal reason is that its
independence was not concomitant with the right of peoples to
external self-determination.321 In other words, Transnistria’s
population was not subject to sustained and systematic human
right abuses in extremis, prior to declaring independence. On
the contrary, Transnistria is a traditionally privileged part of
Moldovan territory.
Compounding Transnistria’s failure to comply with the per-
emptory norm of self-determination is the ongoing involvement
of Russian troops on Transnistrian soil. Ostensibly, Russian
troops have remained in Transnistria for the purposes of
peacekeeping. This direct and open-ended involvement, howev-
er, has ensured that the peremptory norm prohibiting the ille-
gal use of force has been violated, a fact that strongly militates
against Transnistria’s statehood.
f. Scholarly Opinion
The view that UNC secession requires compliance with per-
emptory norms is heavily supported by scholarly opinion.
Crawford, for example, has observed:
No doubt the principle of effectiveness remains a major con-
sideration; it was noted in connection with the spate of State-
creation in the early 1990s. Practice, however, does not sup-
port the conclusion that it is the only element, and the devel-
opment of the concept of peremptory norms in the Vienna
Convention confirms this conclusion: norms that are non-
derogable and peremptory cannot be violated by State-
creation any more than they can be by treaty making.322
Raič has similarly noted:
[O]n the basis of the practice of explicit non-recognition of
claims to statehood it must be concluded, that for the emer-
gence of a State in the sense of, and thus under, international
law, additional and new criteria for statehood must be met
which are not based on effectiveness, and which can be
grouped under the broader heading of the obligation to re-
321. See discussion supra Part II.
322. CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 107.
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spect fundamental rules of international law (that is, at least
jus cogens) during the entity’s creation.323
The same author later concludes that “the existence of a State
under international law is to be determined on the basis of (a)
criteria based on the concept of effectiveness (the traditional
criteria) and (b) criteria based on legality [compliance with
peremptory norms].”324 Other scholars have reached similar
conclusions.325
g. Conclusion
It emerges from the foregoing that entities purportedly creat-
ed by UNC secession may be regarded as not possessing state-
hood, and that the declaratory recognition theory is more re-
flective of state practice than the constitutive. It follows that
additional legal factors may operate to deny the statehood of
entities purportedly created by UNC secession. As postulated
by scholars such as Crawford and Raič, these additional legal
factors are peremptory norms of international law which can-
not be derogated from. Thus, any argument that a distinction
might be drawn between statehood having legal effect (without
peremptory norm violations) and statehood having no legal ef-
fect326 (with peremptory norm violations), as Dugard has inti-
mated, is incorrect. Peremptory norms violations during the
323. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 156.
324. Id. at 167.
325. DUURSMA, supra note 164, at 127–28; James E. S. Fawcett, Security
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seems to accord with this position. In Chapter III, which deals with breaches
of peremptory norms, Article 41(2) provides that “[n]o State shall recognize as
lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of Article
40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.” A priori, it
would seem that a putative state born of peremptory norm violations could
not be deemed to have satisfied the legal criteria for statehood in interna-
tional law, even if effective. For general commentary on Article 41(2), see
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Session, supra note 230, at 286-91.
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process of UNC secession will prevent the attainment of state-
hood.
It also emerges that the conclusions immediately above can-
not be dismissed simply on the grounds of realpolitik. In the
cases of Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria,
the existing state was only a world power in one instance, that
of Chechnya and Russia. In the remaining case studies, Russia
actually supported the purported UNC secessions, but to no
avail. If these events were to be explained purely on the
grounds of realpolitik, one might expect attempted UNC seces-
sions with the support of a world power to be more successful.
Rather, it seems that the failure to adhere to peremptory
norms, namely, the right of peoples to self-determination and
the prohibition on the illegal use of force, offer a more convinc-
ing explanation as to why these purported UNC secessions
were unsuccessful.
C. How is a Breach of Peremptory Norms to be Identified?
Having determined that peremptory norm violations during
the process of UNC secession will prevent the attainment of
statehood, it must be considered how such violations are to be
identified. Is it up to individual states to identify violations, or
should the international community adopt a consensus ap-
proach? In this regard, the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sku-
biszewski in the Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Aus-
tralia)327 provides guidance. Referring to the peremptory norm
prohibiting the illegal use of force, Judge Skubiszewski has
remarked that the obligation to refuse recognition in the con-
text of the illegal use of force “does not arise only as a result of
a decision by the Security Council ordering non-recognition.
The rule is self-executory.”328 In other words, individual states
are legally obliged to not extend recognition to UNC secession-
ist entities that have violated peremptory norms during their
formative process. This obligation endures even when interna-
327. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 92 (June
30).
328. Id. at 262–63 (dissenting opinion of Skubiszewski, J.). See generally
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tional fora, such as the General Assembly and Security Coun-
cil, have remained silent.
D. Are States Created by UNC Secession Held to Stricter Ac-
count vis-à-vis Compliance with Peremptory Norms Compared
with Already Existing States?
One final matter requiring consideration is whether states
created by UNC secession are held to stricter account vis-à-vis
compliance with peremptory norms compared with already ex-
isting states. In this regard, state practice indicates in the af-
firmative.
It has been demonstrated that the TRNC and Transnistria
violated the interconnected peremptory norms of the right of
peoples to self-determination and the prohibition on the illegal
use of force, and have therefore been denied statehood. With
regard to already existing states, however, it is clear that a
breach of the peremptory norm prohibiting the illegal use of
force does not necessarily call statehood into question. Turkey
and Russia, which respectively deployed military forces into
the TRNC and Transnistria, continue to enjoy statehood. Fur-
thermore, the United States has been accused of routinely vio-
lating the peremptory norm prohibiting the illegal use of force
over several decades. The most recent example is the 2003 in-
vasion of Iraq which occurred for factually unsubstantiated
reasons and without Security Council authorization. It is be-
yond question, however, that the United States has not had its
statehood called into question. Nor have other states, such as
Britain and Australia, which were also involved in the illegal
occupation of Iraq.
State practice thus indicates that a violation of peremptory
norms during the process of UNC secession will prevent that
entity’s attainment of statehood, whilst a similar breach by an
already existing state will not necessarily affect statehood.
These different consequences are perhaps not surprising, given
that international law has traditionally given preference to the
continuity, as opposed to extinction, of states.329 To allow per-
329. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 701 (“[G]enerally, the presump-
tion––in practice a strong presumption––favours the continuity and disfa-
vours the extinction of an established State.”); see also id. at 672–95; MAREK,
supra note 163, at 548; Oscar Schachter, State Succession: The Once and Fu-
ture Law, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 253, 258–60 (1993); Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong
and Succession of Treaties, 46 INT’L&COMP. L.Q. 181, 183–87 (1997).
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emptory norm violations to invalidate the statehood of already
existing states would lead to an unacceptable situation where-
by considerable territory would be open to challenge by third
states. Clearly, this extreme application of peremptory norms
would be legally and practically unacceptable.330
E. Breach of Peremptory Norms During the Process of UNC Se-
cession and the Legal Obligation of Nonrecognition
Where a breach of peremptory norms occurs during the pro-
cess of UNC secession, a legal obligation arises on the part of
third states to refuse recognition to the entity concerned. This
arises as a result of the declaratory recognition theory, consid-
eration of relevant state practice in terms of physical acts and
omissions, and the doctrine of nonrecognition for entities that
have not satisfied the objective legal criteria for statehood.331
The origins of the legal obligation of nonrecognition can be
traced to the response of U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Stim-
son, to Japan’s seizure of Chinese Manchuria during late 1931
and subsequent purported establishment of Manchukuo. On
January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent two identical notes to
China and Japan containing the following statement:
In view of the present situation and of its rights and obliga-
tions therein, the American Government deems it to be its du-
ty to notify both the government of the Chinese Republic and
the Imperial Japanese that it cannot admit the legality of any
situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or
agreement entered into between these government, or agents
thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United
States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to
the sovereignty, the independence or the territorial and ad-
ministrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the in-
ternational policy relative to China, commonly known as the
Open Door Policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any
situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by
330. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 158.
331. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 410–23 (1961); CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 160; DUGARD, supra note
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PUBLIC 25 (1967); Antonello Tancredi, Neither Authorized nor Prohibited -
Secession and International Law after Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
18 IT. Y.B. INT’L L. 37, 62 (2008).
92 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of
Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Ja-
pan, as well as the United States are parties.332
This position was afterward endorsed by the League of Nations
Assembly, which on March 11, 1932, declared it was “incum-
bent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recog-
nize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought
about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions or the Pact of Paris.”333 The Assembly then appointed an
Advisory Committee to delineate the precise scope of nonrecog-
nition with regards to Manchukuo. The committee recommend-
ed that Manchukuo be prohibited, in toto, from accession to in-
ternational conventions, even those which dealt with seemingly
innocuous subject matter such as the 1913 Universal Postal
Convention and 1926 Sanitary Convention.334 Passports issued
by Manchukuo were deemed to be without legal effect, and
states were prohibited from making quotations in “Manchukuo”
currency. Regarding consuls, the committee considered it ac-
ceptable for states to maintain their diplomatic presence in
Manchukuo for the protection of the citizens of these states.
Consuls were, however, under the strict obligation not to un-
dertake any action which might be interpreted as indicating
express or implied recognition of Manchukuo as a state.335
The recommendations of the committee were therefore to en-
force an absolutist policy of nonrecognition against Manchukuo.
This absolutist position, however, was ultimately found to be
untenable, with the League of Nations making a series of con-
cessions relating to issues, including, inter alia, postal services
and the issuing of visas.336
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More recent guidance on the legal obligation of non-
recognition has been provided by the ICJ in its Namibia Advi-
sory Opinion.337 Namibia had been a German colony before the
establishment of the League of Nations, but upon Germany’s
defeat in World War I the colony became a “C” mandate, the
administration of which was entrusted to neighboring South
Africa. With the demise of the League of Nations, South Africa
assumed unfettered control of Namibia, and when Chapter XII
of the U.N. Charter purported to resurrect Namibia’s mandate
status South Africa objected, arguing that it was no longer sub-
ject to any international legal obligations. For a period of thir-
teen years the General Assembly called upon South Africa to
perform its obligations and promote Namibia’s sovereign inde-
pendence. As a consequence of Pretoria’s resistance to such re-
quests, the General Assembly terminated South Africa’s man-
date relationship with Namibia in October 1996. In 1970 Secu-
rity Council Resolution 276 declared South Africa’s continuing
presence in Namibia illegal.338 It was against this backdrop
that the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion was delivered.339
After determining Resolution 276 was a bona fide “declara-
tion of illegality and invalidity,”340 the ICJ held that U.N.
member states were:
[U]nder obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's
presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of
or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and in
particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa
implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or
assistance to, such presence and administration.341
The court then expounded specifically upon the types of deal-
ings and interactions with South African authorities within
Namibia, which would be inconsistent with the declaration of
illegality and invalidity, given that they might imply South Af-
337. Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
338. S.C. Res. 276, ¶ 2 (Jan. 30, 1970).
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rica’s continuing presence in Namibia as legal.342 The court
noted that the legal obligation of nonrecognition entailed ab-
stention from treaty relations in all cases where the South Af-
rican government purported to act on behalf of or concerning
Namibia. Further, this obligation required that states refrain
from invoking or applying bilateral treaties concluded by South
Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which involved ac-
tive intergovernmental cooperation. It also required abstention
from diplomatic and consular activity in Namibia and from
“economic and other forms of relationship or dealings with
South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia which may
entrench its authority over the Territory.”343 This has generally
been interpreted as mandating the nullity of all South Africa’s
official acts vis-à-vis Namibia.344
The court did note, however, that nullity cannot be extended
to multilateral treaties of a “humanitarian character,” as to do
so may “adversely affect the people of Namibia.”345 For similar
reasons, it also suggested that nullity could not be extended to
government acts relating to private matters such as “the regis-
tration of births deaths and marriages.”346
Judge Dillard in his Separate Opinion supported the court’s
views on the legal obligation of nonrecognition, although he did
indicate some qualifications. After suggesting that nonrecogni-
tion required “a negative duty of restraint, not a positive duty
of action”347 he noted that the doctrine of nonrecognition “is not
so severe as to deny that any source of right whatever can ac-
crue to third persons acting in good faith” as “the cause of min-
imizing needless hardship and friction would be hindered ra-
ther than helped.”348
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generally RAIČ, supra note 43, at 160.
343. Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 124.
344. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 163; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 165.
345. Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 122.
346. Id. ¶ 125.
347. Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 166 (separate opinion by
Dillard, J.).
348. Id. at 166–67. Judge Petrèn went even further than Judge Dillard,
dissenting on the question of nonrecognition and criticizing the severity of
obligations espoused by the court. Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at
134–36 (separate opinion by Petrèn, J.). Judge Petrèn suggested that nullity
was qualified by “human considerations and practical needs.” Id. at 134. He
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In light of the foregoing it would seem that intergovernmen-
tal cooperation on humanitarian grounds is permitted insofar
as such cooperation does not imply the recognition or legality of
the illegality under contention—in this case, South Africa’s
continued illegal administration of Namibia.349 It might be ob-
served, therefore, that the court was departing from the posi-
tion of absolutist nonrecognition espoused decades earlier in
the context of Manchukuo.
The view expressed by the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory
Opinion350 has been affirmed by the Security Council in its
conduct relating to the TRNC, with no resolution imposing a
wholesale ban upon multilateral treaties which deal exclusively
with the human rights of individuals.351 The same approach
has been affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in
Loizidou v Turkey.352
Subsequent cases before the ICJ such as Case Concerning
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia)353 and Legal Consequences
also remarked that “necessities of a practical of humanitarian nature may
justify certain [intergovernmental] contacts or certain forms of [intergovern-
mental] co-operation.” Id.
349. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 163–64; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 167;
GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, supra note 241, at 310–11.
350. Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. at 55–58 ¶¶ 122–33.
351. RAIČ, supra note 43, at 162.
352. The European Court of Human Rights noted,
The Court confines itself to the above conclusion and does not con-
sider it desirable, let alone necessary, in the present context to elab-
orate a general theory concerning the lawfulness of legislative and
administrative acts of the “TRNC.” It notes, however, that interna-
tional law recognizes the legitimacy of certain legal arrangements
and transactions in such a situation, for instance as regards the reg-
istration of births, deaths, and marriages, “the effects of which can
be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the [t]erritory.”
Loizidou v Turkey, Judgment, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, ¶ 45; see also Na-
mibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 125.
353. East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 at ¶
29 (June 30). See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 168–72.; Gerry J.
Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323 (1994); Chris-
tine M. Chinkin, East Timor Moves into the World Court, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L.
206 (1993); Maria Clara Maffei, The Case of East Timor before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice – Some Tentative Comments, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 223
(1993); Thomas D. Grant, East Timor, The UN System, and Enforcing Non-
Recognition in International Law, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 273 (2000); Gino
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of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory (Advisory Opinion)354 have confirmed the legal obligation
of nonrecognition. So too has the 2005 African Union Non-
Aggression and Common Defence Pact, which in Article 4(c)
requires that “States parties undertake not to recognize any
territorial acquisition or special advantage, resulting from the
use of aggression.”355 The International Law Commission, in its
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts 2001, has also confirmed the legal obligation of nonrec-
ognition for territorial entities which breach peremptory norms
during their formative process, codifying the customary law
legal obligation of nonrecognition in Articles 40 and 41.356
Naldi, The East Timor Case and the Role of the International Court of Justice
in the Evolution of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, 5 AUSTL. J.
HUM. RTS. 106 (1999); André de Hoogh, Australia and East Timor: Rights
erga omnes, Complicity and Non-Recognition, 1999 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 63
(1999).
354. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 200 (July 9). See gener-
ally CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 172–73; Fr Robert J. Araujo, Implementation
of the ICJ Advisory Opinion – the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Fences [Do Not] Make Good
Neighbors?, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 349 (2004); Christine Gray, The ICJ Advisory
Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 527 (2004).
355. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 222, at 373.
356. Articles 40 provides:
This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is en-
tailed by a serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a
peremptory norm of general international law . . . . A breach of such
an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by
the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.
Article 41 provides:
States shall cooperate to bring an end through lawful means any se-
rious breach within the meaning of article 40 . . . . No State shall
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within
the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintain-
ing that situation . . . . This article is without prejudice to other con-
sequences referred to in this Part and to such further consequences
that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under inter-
national law.
Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the work of its Fifty-Third Session, supra note 230,
at 282, 286.
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Finally, it should also be observed that the ICJ in its Kosovo
Advisory Opinion357 has expressed the view that a declaration
of independence made in the context of peremptory norm viola-
tions would be unlawful. This dicta, although not referring ex-
plicitly to the customary law of nonrecognition, nonetheless af-
firms the interconnection between the creation of states by
UNC secession and peremptory norms of international law.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing article has propounded three principal points.
First, it has argued that there is a connection between UNC
secession and the criteria for statehood in international law.
Put simply, states that are created in conformity with the right
of oppressed peoples to UNC secession in customary interna-
tional law do not have to strictly satisfy the effective govern-
ment criterion. If this were not the case, then the principle of
self-determination would itself be rendered almost meaning-
less, as very few unilateral secessions, be they in the colonial or
non-colonial context, have been achieved in circumstances
where the effective government criterion has been strictly com-
plied with.
Second, it has been argued that the declaratory recognition
theory is more reflective of state practice than the constitutive.
This means that a state created by UNC secession may exist in
the absence of international recognition. However it has also
been shown that where an entity established by UNC secession
has violated peremptory norms, the international community
will deny statehood and a legal obligation of nonrecognition
will apply. From this it can be determined that recognition
serves both political and legal purposes.
Third, in light of the preceding two points, the article has ar-
gued that there have been many examples of entities purport-
edly created by UNC secession but which have been denied
statehood by the international community. This is the result of
statehood now being predicated not only of the criteria for ef-
fectiveness (as modified by the law of self-determination) but
also compliance with peremptory norms. Where a state has
been purportedly created in violation of peremptory norms,
357. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 81
(July 22).
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statehood will fail to crystalize. More than likely, this will oc-
cur when there is a violation of the interconnected peremptory
norms of self-determination and the prohibition on the illegal
use of force.358 This arguably explains why Bangladesh, Croa-
tia, and Kosovo achieved statehood as a result of UNC seces-
sion, but the TRNC, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Transnistria, have not.
Since World War II, it is therefore arguable that there has
been a gradual shift in the requirements for statehood in the
context of UNC secession. No longer are the criteria for state-
hood based on effectiveness sufficient. Rather, these traditional
criteria have now been supplemented, and perhaps even over-
ridden, by the importance of peremptory norms, particularly
the right of peoples to self-determination. This means that a
state purportedly created by UNC secession in violation of per-
emptory norms will, in contemporary times, simply fail to at-
tain statehood.
358. It is conceivable, however, that if an entity purportedly created by
UNC secession systematically breached other peremptory norms during its
formative process, such as the prohibition on racial discrimination, apartheid,
and torture, it would also be denied statehood.
